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POLICING SYMMETRY *
TERESSA RAVENELL ** & RILEY H. ROSS III ***
Every day, criminal court judges across the United States decide whether the
police had probable cause to arrest a suspect. When a court finds the police lacked
probable cause, the arrestee may bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil claim against
the arresting officer or municipality for a wrongful arrest. Yet, under current
issue preclusion rules, whether the civil court will relitigate probable cause
depends, in part, on who prevailed at the criminal court hearing. If the
government prevails, the suspect will be precluded from relitigating the question
of probable cause because they were a party to the original suit. However, if the
criminal court finds police lacked probable cause, the government may relitigate
probable cause in the civil case because, under state preclusion rules, the
municipality and police officials were not the “same party” that prosecuted the
criminal case. This is problematic. If relitigated, not only may the criminal and
civil dispositions result in different conclusions about the exact same issue, but
these inconsistencies suggest a much bigger problem: a flawed, arbitrary justice
system that favors the government.
There should be a rebuttable presumption that the prosecutor, municipality, and
police are the same party for the purpose of issue preclusion in probable cause
cases. Legal scholarship discussing the procedural relationships between criminal
and civil cases wholly fails to consider how governmental identities might factor
into issue preclusion determinations. This Article fills that gap. Party identity is
at the core of both issue preclusion and § 1983. This Article is the first to consider
how these two theories of identity should inform one another as parties shift from
criminal to civil litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Being arrested is a serious governmental intrusion that results in both
short-term and long-term effects. During an arrest, the police handcuff and pat
down the arrestee. And, to be clear, the pat down is not a cursory search of one’s
outer clothing. Rather, it is “a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a
person’s clothing all over his or her body” 1 to discover weapons and evidence.
These indignities continue at the police station where the arrestee may be
fingerprinted, photographed, questioned, and strip searched. 2 All of this often

1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968). The injury associated with an arrest is further
exacerbated when the arrest occurs in public where “the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall
with his hands raised,” or lies facedown on the pavement as a passerby observes their arrest. Id. at 17
(citing L.L. Priar & T.F. Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 481, 481 (1954)).
2. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 325 (2012). “Strip search” may be an
imprecise term, but regardless of how a strip search is performed, it is “undoubtedly humiliating and
deeply offensive to many.” Id. at 341 (Alito, J., concurring). The Court described the variations in strip
search procedures as follows:
It may refer simply to the instruction to remove clothing while an officer observes from a
distance of, say, five feet or more; it may mean a visual inspection from a closer, more
uncomfortable distance; it may include directing detainees to shake their heads or to run their
hands through their hair to dislodge what might be hidden there; or it may involve instructions
to raise arms, to display foot insteps, to expose the back of the ears, to move or spread the
buttocks or genital areas, or to cough in a squatting position.
Id. at 325.
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occurs without a prior determination by a neutral magistrate judge that there
was probable cause. 3
Now, imagine that a judge determines that the police lacked probable
cause for the arrest in the first place. Under these circumstances, it is not
surprising that criminal defendants become civil plaintiffs, frequently bringing
federal civil claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the municipality and the
arresting officers for deprivations of their Fourth Amendment rights. This
Article focuses on an issue which, to date, scholars have ignored: the peculiar
role of issue preclusion in § 1983 probable cause litigation. Or, more
specifically, whether the issue preclusion doctrine binds a civil court to the
criminal court’s prior determination that the plaintiff was arrested or detained
with or without probable cause. Indeed, a combined reading of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause 4 and the Full Faith and Credit Act 5 dictate that (with some
exceptions) a state court’s proceedings must be honored by both state and
federal courts in the United States. It naturally follows that a state court’s
finding that the police lacked probable cause for the arrest should be honored
in a subsequent federal lawsuit.
Consider, however, a fairly run-of-the-mill example. New York City
police arrest Brown and he is charged with possessing a weapon, menacing, and
resisting arrest. The prosecutor dismisses the first two charges but tries the
resisting arrest charge. To prove the remaining charge, the prosecutor must
prove the police had probable cause to arrest Brown. At a nonjury trial the court
concludes “the People” failed to prove probable cause and finds Brown not
guilty.
Brown then files a civil suit alleging false arrest and false imprisonment.
Not surprisingly, he seeks to preclude the officers from relitigating the question
of probable cause. The trial court holds that the City of New York is precluded
from relitigating the question of probable cause. Reversing, the New York
Court of Appeals concludes that “[t]he city and the District Attorney are
separate entities and . . . do not stand in sufficient relationship to apply the
doctrine.” 6
3. A person’s resulting arrest record often endures, even if the evidence is suppressed and the
charges ultimately are dismissed for lack of probable cause. MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE
EMSELLEM, WANTED: ACCURATE FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 9 (2013),
https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Report-Wanted-Accurate-FBI-BackgroundChecks-Employment.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWM2-LJ66].
4. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
5. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1738, 62 Stat. 869, 947 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738).
6. Brown v. City of New York, 458 N.E.2d 1250, 1251 (N.Y. 1983) (“Identity of parties, an
essential element for application of the doctrine of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, was lacking
here so that the determination made in the criminal case on the issue of the unlawfulness of plaintiff’s
arrest could not be held to bar the city from contesting the issue in the civil action.”). This hypothetical
is drawn loosely from the facts of Brown v. City of New York, 485 N.E.2d 1250, 1251 (N.Y. 1983).
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In most jurisdictions, the civil defendant must have been party to the prior
criminal suit for issue preclusion on the probable cause question to apply. 7
Consequently, § 1983 defendants (typically municipalities and police officials)
may relitigate the probable cause question because, under current standards,
they were not a party to the original action. On the other hand, § 1983 plaintiffs
will almost always be bound by the criminal court’s adverse decision because
they were party to the original suit. This Article challenges this asymmetrical
conclusion. This Article’s normative claim is that there should be a rebuttable
presumption that the prosecutor, municipality, and police are the same party for
the purpose of issue preclusion in these probable cause cases. 8 While this will
not guarantee that § 1983 plaintiffs will prevail, it ensures that they will not be
forced to relitigate an issue that is key to their civil claim. Establishing this
rebuttable presumption has the potential to impact many § 1983 cases. 9 But
perhaps more importantly, implementing this rebuttable presumption corrects
an asymmetry that currently skews in the government’s favor.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the role of probable
cause in civil litigation and establishes two important points. First, probable
cause is a necessary element of § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims alleging false
arrest and detention. Second, despite contrary legal holdings, the plaintiff
should bear the burden of proving a Fourth Amendment deprivation (which in
false arrest and detention cases will necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the
officer lacked probable cause). Part II provides an overview of issue preclusion,
particularly in the context of § 1983, and delves into the established rules
concerning the “same party” requirement integral to issue preclusion
determinations. Part III examines the way in which § 1983 classifies defendants.
As we explain, these classifications are integral to § 1983 liability that courts
and, to date, scholars have entirely ignored. Most importantly, courts and
scholars have overlooked how the governmental ties that bind these defendants
might inform issue preclusion determinations. Finally, Part IV argues that, even
7. See infra Section II.C.
8. To date, only a few scholars have considered how preclusion rules affect § 1983
determinations. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court Term 1980, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17,
280–81 (1981) (summarizing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)); Joshua M.D. Segal, Rebalancing
Fairness and Efficiency: The Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel in § 1983 Actions, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1305,
1308 (2009) (“[I]n situations where applying the holding of a criminal court decision promotes the
overarching goals of efficiency and fairness, courts should apply collateral estoppel in order to prevent
relitigation of a question of constitutionality in a subsequent § 1983 case.”). While these discussions
advance the conversation, they do not adequately consider the governmental links between prosecutors,
municipalities, and police officials.
9. Removing the barrier of having to relitigate the favorable finding that police lacked probable
cause on the initial arrest will no doubt increase the chance that § 1983 lawsuits move forward rather
than being dismissed at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage simply by the rules of
probability. In other words, the fewer elements needed to defeat such motions, the more likely you are
to defeat such motions.
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in the rare cases where § 1983 defendants establish they are not the same party
as the prosecutor, courts should rarely, if ever, grant summary judgment on the
probable cause issue when a criminal court has found probable cause wanting.
I. PROBABLE CAUSE IN CIVIL LITIGATION
A.

Defining Probable Cause

Whether an arrest violates the Fourth Amendment often hinges on the
question of probable cause. 10 Police officials may arrest a suspect in a public
space without a warrant, but they must have probable cause to believe the
person is guilty of the crime for which they are being arrested. 11 “To evaluate
whether the police had probable cause to make an arrest . . . [courts] consider
the nature and trustworthiness of the evidence of criminal conduct available to
the police.” 12 The relevant inquiry is whether a “prudent man” would believe
the suspect “committed or was committing an offense” based on the facts and
circumstances that were before the arresting officers. 13
Unfortunately, probable cause is convoluted—it “is incapable of precise
definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities
and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” 14 Probable cause is not an
especially high standard, but it does afford people some protection from
government intrusions. 15
Perhaps the clearest example of an arrest without probable cause is an
instance where an officer has knowingly relied upon false or misleading
10. The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The relationship between
the first clause, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and the second clause, requiring
probable cause, has been the subject of much debate among scholars and judges. JOSHUA DRESSLER
& ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.01 (6th ed. 2016). The Fourth
Amendment specifically prohibits judges from issuing warrants absent probable cause, but it does not
prohibit law enforcement officials from arresting a person without a warrant. An arrest may be
unreasonable and, accordingly, violate the Fourth Amendment, even if the officers have probable cause
for the seizure. For example, if an officer uses excessive force during an arrest, the arrest may be
unreasonable even if the officer has an arrest warrant or probable cause to believe the suspect is guilty
of the crime for which they are being arrested. See, e.g., Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1064
(9th Cir. 2004) (“Although an excessive force claim is subject to a ‘reasonableness’ standard under the
Fourth Amendment as is a false arrest claim, the two claims require quite different inquiries.” (citing
Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 1991))).
11. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 420–24 (1976).
12. Beier, 354 F.3d at 1064.
13. Id.
14. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138
S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (cautioning that probable cause “is ‘a fluid concept’ that is ‘not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules’” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983))).
15. See 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 52 (4th ed. 2002).
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information in a probable cause affidavit in order to obtain an arrest warrant. 16
For example, in Rainsberger v. Benner, 17 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial
of a detective’s motion for summary judgment where the detective “submitted
a probable cause affidavit that was riddled with lies and undercut by the
omission of exculpatory evidence.” 18 Finding the lies and omissions material,
the court rejected the detective’s argument that a corrected affidavit would have
supported a probable cause determination. 19 To reach this conclusion, the court
stripped away the misleading information from the affidavit and, evaluating the
remaining evidence, found the claim for probable cause threadbare. 20 Although
probable cause does not require absolute proof of a crime, it does require a
“common-sense inquiry” and depends on the totality of the circumstances. 21 In
this case, the detective’s corrected affidavit was nothing more than “bare
suspicion” and could not support a finding of probable cause. 22
In somewhat less egregious examples, judges may find probable cause
wanting where an officer’s conclusion simply does not make sense under the law
or in fact. For example, the Tenth Circuit found an officer lacked probable cause
where he arrested a driver for “possession of a firearm after former conviction
of a felony,” but the driver’s criminal record showed only a thirteen-year-old
juvenile adjudication for breaking and entering. 23 Importantly, under
16. See Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 652 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding no probable cause where
an officer relied on false information and excluded exculpatory evidence in their affidavit for an arrest
warrant).
17. 913 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2019).
18. Id. at 642 (explaining plaintiff’s accusations against the detective).
19. Id. at 643. For example, in the affidavit, the detective included phone records that placed the
plaintiff inside his mother’s apartment about an hour before he reported her death to police. Id. at 645.
However, the detective did not account for the call being routed through a cell tower in Chicago, which
was one hour ahead from where the plaintiff was in Indianapolis. Id. at 646. Importantly, the detective
knew of the time difference yet chose to use the “inaccurate and incriminating” time in his affidavit.
Id. Further, among other issues, he mischaracterized the plaintiff’s behavior in a surveillance video to
make it appear that the plaintiff threw away a murder weapon, but an objective view of the video
showed him throwing away a piece of small trash. Id. In addition, the detective alleged that the plaintiff
was unconcerned for his mother, as evidenced by the fact that he never asked the detective about how
his mother was doing the day she died, but the detective knew the plaintiff was getting text updates
from his sister. Id. at 647.
20. Id. at 648 (noting that information supporting probable cause was simply the officer’s belief
that the murderer may have been someone familiar to the family because the attack was not connected
to a burglary).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 649 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
23. See Courtney v. Oklahoma, 722 F.3d 1216, 1221, 1227 (10th Cir. 2013). In Courtney v.
Oklahoma, 722 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2013), an officer pulled a driver over for driving eighty-two miles
per hour where the posted limit was seventy-five miles per hour. Id. at 1220. When the officer spoke
with the driver, he observed what he felt were “signs of extreme nervousness.” Id. at 1221. When the
officer explained he was suspicious of criminal activity and asked if the driver had any drugs, cash, or
firearms, the driver informed the officer that he had a gun in the trunk of the vehicle. Id. The officer
then ran the driver’s criminal record and found the juvenile adjudication from May 1998. Id. The court
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Oklahoma law, “a juvenile adjudication over ten years old” did not qualify as an
underlying felony preventing possession of a firearm. 24 Thus, the court found
it was unreasonable for the officer to conclude the driver was a felon in
possession of a weapon. 25 Without the felony record, there was no probable
cause to believe that the driver was violating the Oklahoma statute prohibiting
a felon from possessing a weapon. 26
Additionally, courts may find that the probable cause standard is not
satisfied where an officer made an unreasonable conclusion regarding a material
fact. 27 For example, the Eighth Circuit upheld a false arrest claim where an
officer believed a woman kicked him, causing an “explosion” of pain in his calf,
even though it was logistically implausible that the woman had kicked him, the
officer never saw the woman kick him, and no eyewitnesses told him that she
kicked him. 28 The Eighth Circuit focused on whether or not it was objectively
reasonable for the officer to believe that the woman had kicked him. 29 In
reaching its determination, the court found that under the totality of the
circumstances, the officer’s belief was unreasonable. 30
concluded it was unreasonable for the officer to believe the driver was violating the felon in possession
of a firearm statute because the traffic stop occurred in October 2010. Id. at 1226.
24. Id. at 1226.
25. Id. The court further reversed the grant of officer qualified immunity and rejected the officer’s
argument that he simply made a mistaken legal conclusion as to the scope of the firearm statute. Id. at
1226–27. As the court highlighted, the statute was unambiguous, and the information available to the
officer at the time of the arrest showed that the driver’s criminal record did not count as a felony record.
Id. at 1227.
26. Id. at 1227.
27. See Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 901 F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir. 2018) (noting that when the
arresting officer has not observed or been relayed information about the crime, probable cause may be
lacking).
28. Id. at 972–73. In Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 901 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2018), the plaintiff
called the police because her seventeen-year-old son was acting violently. Id. at 965. When the two
responding officers arrived, the woman was clutching a hammer for her safety and allowed them entry
into her apartment building. Id. After speaking with the woman and her son, the police moved to arrest
the son, who was located just outside the apartment door in the hallway, and a struggle quickly ensued.
Id. at 965–66. During this struggle, the woman retreated further into her apartment in order to give
the officers room. Id. at 966. While struggling to place the teenager under arrest, one of the officers
felt a sharp pain, which he described as an “explosion” in his calf, which led him to ask the woman if
she had kicked him. Id. She said she had not, but the officer was adamant, even though he did not see
her kick him, nor did he know if she was even standing close enough to kick him. Id. He placed her
under arrest based on his conclusion, and she spent three days in jail and later sued under § 1983 for
violations of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
29. See id. at 967.
30. Id. In relevant part, the court focused on the fact that she was 5’4” and weighed about 140
pounds, had a physical disability, and was wearing a nightgown and slippers. Id. at 968. Further, the
woman did not react negatively to the officers, nor was she evasive when they asked her about the
alleged kick. Id. Perhaps most persuasive to the court was that the officer did not observe the woman
kicking him and no one told him that she had; for the court this “cu[t] decisively against . . . probable
cause.” Id. at 969. In denying his claim for qualified immunity, the court pointed to a previous case
where the Eighth Circuit held “that an officer who did not witness a crime did not have arguable
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Finally, a judge or jury may find that the officers simply lacked sufficient
information to meet the probable cause standard, despite it being a very low
bar. As the Seventh Circuit instructed in Fox v. Hayes, 31 “[p]robable cause may
be a loose concept, but it leaves no room for the absurd.” 32 In Fox, one of the
§ 1983 plaintiffs, Mr. Fox, was arrested and charged with the murder of his
three-year-old daughter, Riley Fox, after she was kidnapped, assaulted, and
drowned. 33 Mr. Fox was eventually cleared and filed a § 1983 claim against
multiple defendants, including the municipality and police involved with the
criminal investigation. 34 The jury awarded the Foxes $12.2 million in
damages. 35
Reviewing the jury’s verdict in favor of the Foxes, the court rejected the
detectives’ “laundry list of facts” that purportedly supported a finding of
probable cause. 36 The court repeatedly explained that a jury did not have to
credit the detectives’ testimony, especially when it was contradictory. 37 After
taking “out the fluff” of the detectives’ argument, the court found the detectives
simply did not have enough evidence or facts to transform a suspicion into
probable cause. 38
Thus, although probable cause is a low standard, it does not permit arrests
that are based on nothing more than false information, unreasonable
conclusions of fact or applications of law, or mere suspicion. And there is no
question that police occasionally arrest, detain, and imprison people without
probable cause. When they do, as evidenced by Fox, criminal defendants may
bring a civil action against the police.
However, when the case shifts from criminal to civil court, as
counterintuitive as it might seem, the probable cause standard remains constant.
Typically, criminal courts apply a much higher burden of proof than civil courts.
To establish guilt in a criminal case, the prosecutor must prove the defendant’s
guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 39 In contrast, to establish liability in a civil
probable cause to arrest a suspect after speaking with her only for ‘twenty seconds’ when other
eyewitnesses were present and would have exonerated her.” Id. at 971 (quoting Kuehl v. Burtis, 173
F.3d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1999)).
31. 600 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2010).
32. Id. at 834.
33. Id. at 825.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 826.
36. Id. at 834 (explaining that the defendants’ version of the facts supporting probable cause was
not given deference on appeal, but rather the Foxes’ story determined the outcome).
37. Id. The court recognized that an unemotional parent or odd behavior could alert an officer to
involvement, but that testimony was inconsistent with Mr. Fox’s actual behavior that day. Id.
38. Id. at 835. Mr. Fox spent about eight months in jail, and no one was ever charged with Riley
Fox’s murder. Id. at 825.
39. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (“The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation.”).
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case, the plaintiff must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. 40 Probable
cause, however, carries its own evidentiary standard. “[T]he substance of all the
definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” 41 This
standard falls somewhere above a reasonable suspicion and below a
preponderance of the evidence. 42 Accordingly, it is nonsensical to “prove
probable cause beyond a reasonable doubt” or “prove probable cause by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Probable cause has its own standard and simply
asks whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the suspect was guilty
of the offense for which he was arrested. The probable cause standard should
remain the same, regardless of whether it is being litigated in a civil or criminal
context.
Furthermore, it is useful to note that although discovery procedures vary
in civil and criminal disputes, these differences are irrelevant to probable cause
determinations. The court’s probable cause determination focuses on what the
officer reasonably believed at the time of the arrest, thus analyzing
reasonableness from the officer’s perspective at that time. 43 Accordingly, the
officer possesses all the relevant information the government needs to establish
whether there was probable cause for the suspect’s arrest. 44 Therefore, it is
irrelevant whether criminal discovery procedures are more limited than civil
discovery procedures.
B.

Probable Cause in § 1983 Litigation

If an officer arrests a suspect absent probable cause, the question is what,
if any, civil remedy is available to the putative plaintiff. Most states recognize
the torts of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Some states also
recognize false arrest, which is arguably a subset of false imprisonment claims. 45
40. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983).
41. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
42. The Court described the relationship between probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and a
preponderance of the evidence as such:
We have described reasonable suspicion simply as “a particularized and objective basis” for
suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity, and probable cause to search as existing
where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. We have cautioned
that these two legal principles are not “finely-tuned standards,” comparable to the standards
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
43. See United States v. Reed, 443 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[C]ourts must focus on the
real world situation as known to the officer at th[e] time.”).
44. Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 511 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that a court making a probable
cause determination considers “only the information possessed by the arresting officer at the time of
the arrest”).
45. Although they may arise from a single set of circumstances, these torts differ slightly from
one another. A false arrest occurs when the defendant arrests the plaintiff without the authority to do
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Additionally, the same operative facts that create the state tort law claim will
typically give rise to a federal cause of action. 46 Accordingly, when harmed by a
government official, an individual may have both cognizable state and federal
claims.
To prevail under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a person (“person”
includes municipalities) acting under color of state law subjected or caused the
plaintiff to be subjected to the deprivation of a federally protected right. 47 This
includes the deprivation of a constitutional right. 48 In fact, § 1983 is one of the
primary ways in which constitutional claims are litigated and constitutional
rights upheld. 49 In one respect, this Article concerns how a § 1983 plaintiff
proves a Fourth Amendment violation and, specifically, whether they are able
to rely on a prior criminal court determination.
Even if a plaintiff is able to establish a Fourth Amendment violation, it
does not necessarily follow that the arresting officer or the municipality will be
liable. Qualified immunity generally protects “government officials performing
discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their
so—either because the defendant lacks the privilege to arrest (for example, a civilian) or because the
defendant lacks probable cause for the arrest. W. PAGE KEETON, Dan B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON
& DAVID G. OWEN, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 11 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). In contrast, false imprisonment is an unlawful restraint of an individual’s
mobility. Unlike false arrest, false imprisonment does not require a showing of official governmental
authority. Id. Moreover, a defendant may commit the tort of false imprisonment without necessarily
committing the tort of false arrest. Id. Finally, to prove a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant, with the requisite intent, instigated criminal proceedings against the
plaintiff without probable cause and the prosecution has ended in favor of the plaintiff. Id. As one torts
treatise explains, malicious prosecution “differs from false arrest in that the [former] does not
necessarily involve any detention of the plaintiff at all.” DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN
M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 586 (2d ed. 2016). Similarly, a defendant may commit
malicious prosecution without ever detaining the plaintiff. Id.
The Supreme Court has also recognized that false arrest and malicious prosecution differ from
one another. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388–90 (2007) (distinguishing among false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution).
46. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (“The federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”),
overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
47. Section 1983 reads in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
48. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
49. Hehemann v. City of Cincinnati, No. 93-3766, 1994 WL 714387, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 21,
1994) (“It goes without saying that § 1983 plays a critical role in the preservation of civil rights in this
country. It guards the freedoms that form the core of the Constitution, and its invocation must remain
unburdened in order to enable the vigilant protection of our most precious liberties.”).
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conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” 50 Furthermore, as the Supreme
Court recently suggested in District of Columbia v. Wesby, 51 § 1983 probable
cause claims are well-primed for a grant of qualified immunity. 52 “Given its
imprecise nature, officers will often find it difficult to know how the general
standard of probable cause applies in ‘the precise situation encountered.’” 53
Consequently, even if a court finds that an officer lacked probable cause to
arrest a plaintiff, the court may also find that the officer is entitled to qualified
immunity.
Similarly, § 1983 plaintiffs frequently encounter difficulty establishing
municipal liability. Qualified immunity is not available to municipalities and
should have no impact on those cases. 54 However, the Court has been clear that
a municipality will not be liable simply because it employs a tortfeasor. 55 Rather,
a plaintiff must establish that the municipality, through its policy or custom,
caused the plaintiff to be deprived of a constitutional right. 56 Yet § 1983
plaintiffs often have trouble identifying a municipal policy that caused their
deprivations. 57
These additional challenges do not diminish the import of this Article. As
Section I.B establishes, if a § 1983 plaintiff is unable to establish a Fourth
Amendment violation, the claim is doomed from the outset. To prevail,
regardless of whether one is suing an individual or a municipality, § 1983
plaintiffs must establish that they were deprived of a federally protected right.
To this end, this section considers how an arrestee constructs a § 1983 claim for
an arrest or detention absent probable cause.
50. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Recently, people from across the political
spectrum have advocated for eliminating the qualified immunity defense. Jordan S. Rubin, High Court
Won’t Hear Law Enforcer Qualified Immunity Cases (3), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/justices-wont-take-up-law-enforcer-qualified-immunity-doctrine [https://perma.cc/83FR-U3ZF
(staff-uploaded archive)] (June 15, 2020, 5:17 PM). In June, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on
several cases petitioning the Court to overhaul the affirmative defense. Id. Additionally, on June 25,
2020, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 7120, the “George Floyd Justice in
Policing Act.” H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2020); see also Teressa Ravenell, Law Enforcement Officials,
Qualified Immunity, and the Absolute Immunity of Anonymity, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Aug. 3, 2020),
https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/law-enforcement-officials-qualified-immunity-and-the-absoluteimmunity-of-anonymity/ [https://perma.cc/2TRZ-66E3]. If enacted, § 102 of H.R. 7120 would
eliminate the qualified immunity defense for law enforcement officials. H.R. 7120 § 120; Ravenell,
supra.
51. 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018).
52. Id. at 590.
53. Id.
54. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980).
55. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
56. Id.
57. See Blum v. Koch, 716 F. Supp. 754, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that because a municipal
“policy may be difficult to prove by direct evidence, it may be inferred from a municipal defendant’s
acts or failure to act,” but the latter requires “more proof than a single alleged deprivation”).
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As one might intuit, a wrongful arrest may very well lead to additional
civil claims regarding detention, prosecution, and conviction. Whether these
allegations are classified as Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment
claims is complicated. Typically, courts analyze claims that a police officer
arrested a person without probable cause—false arrest claims—as Fourth
Amendment deprivations. 58 This makes sense since the Fourth Amendment
explicitly references seizures, which qualify as arrests. Similarly, courts
traditionally treat claims of prosecutorial misconduct during trial as Fourteenth
Amendment claims. 59 Courts, however, have vacillated between applying the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to § 1983 claims regarding detention
following an arrest. Until recently, most courts held that the Fourth
Amendment governed “false detention” claims from arrest until a criminal
defendant was brought before a judge. 60 However, courts were split as to
whether the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
substantive due process governed the detention after the defendant had
appeared in court. 61
Manuel v. City of Joliet 62 illustrates the tension between these two claims.
In 2013, Elijah Manuel filed a § 1983 suit against the City of Joliet and several
of its police officials alleging that they had deprived him of his Fourth
Amendment rights. 63 Officers had arrested Manuel on March 18, 2011, for
possession of a bottle of vitamins that officers claimed were illegal drugs. 64 The
officers falsified reports to support their claim, and when Manuel was brought
before a judge for a probable cause determination, the judge found probable
cause existed based entirely upon the police department’s allegations and
58. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274 (1994) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s relevance to
the deprivations of liberty . . . go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions.”).
59. Courts uniformly treat claims that law enforcement or prosecutorial officials failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence as Fourteenth Amendment claims. See Michael Avery, Paying for Silence: The
Liability of Police Officers Under Section 1983 for Suppressing Exculpatory Evidence, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R.
L. REV. 1, 4 (2003). Interestingly, as Professor Michael Avery notes in another article, courts are
divided on whether § 1983 claims that law enforcement officials have fabricated evidence implicate the
Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. Michael Avery, Obstacles to Litigating Civil Claims
for Wrongful Conviction: An Overview, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 439, 445–46 (2009).
60. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (“The Fourth Amendment . . . has been thought
to define [due process] for seizures of person or property in criminal cases, including the detention of
suspects pending trial.”).
61. In tort terms, claims before a judicial appearance are false arrest claims, while claims after the
court appearance are malicious prosecution claims. Courts frequently use state tort law terms to
describe § 1983 claims. See infra notes 82–90 and accompanying text. Judges and scholars have argued
that doing so creates confusion. See infra notes 90–96 and accompanying text. While we agree with the
general idea that referring to § 1983 in state law terms may cause some confusion regarding § 1983’s
elements, we nevertheless employ these terms to differentiate between two types of § 1983 Fourth
Amendment claims—those premised on unlawful arrest and those based upon unlawful detention.
62. 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017).
63. Id. at 916.
64. Id. at 915.
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fabrications. 65 Manuel was held in jail for forty-eight days before he was finally
released. 66 Approximately two years later, he filed a § 1983 claim against the
City of Joliet and several of its police officers claiming he was deprived of his
Fourth Amendment rights. 67 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
dismissal of Manuel’s claim, reasoning that “once detention by reason of arrest
turns into detention by reason of arraignment . . . the Fourth Amendment falls
out of the picture and the detainee’s claim that the detention is improper
becomes a claim of malicious prosecution violative of due process.” 68 In short,
under the Seventh Circuit’s rationale, a judicial proceeding shifts a § 1983 claim
from a Fourth Amendment claim to a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due
process claim. 69
In 2016, the Supreme Court granted Manuel’s petition for certiorari to
determine “[w]hether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizure continues beyond legal process so as to allow a malicious
prosecution claim based upon the Fourth Amendment.” 70 In an opinion written
by Justice Kagan, the Court held that “pretrial detention can violate the Fourth
Amendment not only when it precedes, but also when it follows, the start of
legal process in a criminal case.” 71 The Court reasoned that the Fourth
Amendment protects individuals during both arrest and pretrial detention. 72
According to the Court, the primary issue is not whether a judge determined
there was probable cause but whether the “legal process” has actually satisfied
the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement. 73 Put a bit differently, a
judicial determination does not magically create probable cause. 74 Probable
cause is created by the supportable underlying facts of the case. When those
facts are nonexistent, perhaps because law enforcement officials fabricated
evidence, probable cause is also nonexistent, and the plaintiff has stated a
cognizable Fourth Amendment claim. 75 Accordingly, the Court explicitly
rejected the idea that a judicial determination can “extinguish the detainee’s
Fourth Amendment claim” or convert it into a Fourteenth Amendment claim. 76
Thus, Manuel makes clear that a person arrested and detained without probable
65. Id.
66. Id. at 915–16.
67. Id. at 916.
68. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 590 F. App’x 641, 643–44 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Llovet v. City of
Chicago, 761 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2014)), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017).
69. Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 916.
70. Id. at 923 (emphasis omitted).
71. Id. at 918.
72. Id. at 919.
73. Id. at 918–19.
74. Id. (noting that “[t]he judge’s order holding Manuel for trial therefore lacked any proper
basis” because “[a]ll that the judge had before him were police fabrications about the pills’ content”).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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cause may have a viable § 1983 claim for deprivation of their Fourth
Amendment rights.
Following Manuel, a § 1983 plaintiff can allege three types of Fourth
Amendment claims: (1) claims based upon arrest without probable cause (false
arrest); (2) claims based upon pretrial detention without probable cause (false
imprisonment); and (3) claims based upon excessive force or police brutality
(assault and battery claims). 77 This Article focuses only on the first two
categories. Section I.B.1 explains § 1983 malicious prosecution claims. Section
I.B.2 describes false arrest claims. Importantly, to establish either claim, a
§ 1983 plaintiff must prove there was not probable cause.
1. Section 1983 “Malicious Prosecution” Claims
For years, judges and scholars have debated the concept of a § 1983
“malicious prosecution claim.” 78 As previously noted, this debate primarily
consists of two arguments. The first argument is whether unlawful detention
claims should be characterized as Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment claims and
whether § 1983 malicious prosecution claims incorporate state tort law
elements. 79 The second asks what elements a plaintiff must prove for a viable
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim. 80 Manuel makes clear that pretrial
detentions in the absence of probable cause fall within the parameters of the
Fourth Amendment. However, as Justice Alito points out in his dissent, the
majority fails to explain the elements of this “constitutional tort.” 81
Not surprisingly, courts continue to disagree about the elements that a
plaintiff must prove to succeed on a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Four
circuits require a § 1983 plaintiff to satisfy one or more elements of a state tort
claim for malicious prosecution in addition to establishing the absence of
probable cause. 82 Four circuits only require a § 1983 plaintiff to establish the
77. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (noting that all claims that “law
enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making . . . a[] ‘seizure’” should be “analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness standard’”); Chavez v. County of Bernalillo,
3 F. Supp. 3d 936, 993 n.18 (D.N.M. 2014) (classifying the plaintiff’s false arrest and false
imprisonment claims as Fourth Amendment claims).
78. See, e.g., Erin E. McMannon, Note, The Demise of § 1983 Malicious Prosecution: Separating Tort
Law from the Fourth Amendment, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1479, 1479–80 (2019) (suggesting that “use
of the language of malicious prosecution tort law to describe what really amounts to a Fourth
Amendment seizure claim under § 1983” causes unnecessary confusion).
79. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270–71 n.4 (1994) (analyzing whether unlawful
detention claims fall under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments without deciding whether § 1983
claims incorporate state tort law elements).
80. Id. at 270 n.4 (deciding the first argument and relegating discussion of the second argument
to a footnote).
81. Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 925 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]o flesh out the elements of this
constitutional tort, we must look for ‘tort analogies.’”).
82. See, e.g., Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Though section 1983 provides the
federal claim, we borrow the elements of the underlying malicious prosecution tort from state law.”);
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constitutional violation. 83 Two circuits have held state common law is
inapplicable in this context. 84 One circuit has not yet addressed the issue. 85
In circuits adopting a state common law approach to § 1983 unlawful
detention claims, a plaintiff’s federal § 1983 claim and state tort law claim will
be substantially the same. For example, to establish a state tort claim under New
York state law, a plaintiff is required to meet each of the following elements:
Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81–82 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating the plaintiff can establish a § 1983
malicious prosecution claim through the Fourth Amendment by demonstrating “(1) the defendant
initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant
initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose
other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty”);
Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We look to [state] law to determine
the legal effect of the state court’s action because we have incorporated the relevant elements of the
common law tort of malicious prosecution into our analysis under § 1983.”); Blue v. Lopez, 901 F.3d
1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003)) (“To establish
a federal claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the
common-law tort of malicious prosecution and (2) a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable seizures.”).
83. See, e.g., Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 100–01 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Evans v.
Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012)) (announcing the court was “join[ing] those four circuits
that have adopted a purely constitutional approach, holding that a plaintiff may bring a suit under
§ 1983 . . . if he can establish that: ‘the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to
legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff’s
favor’”); Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Brooks v. City of WinstonSalem, 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996)) (“[T]here is no such thing as a ‘§ 1983 malicious prosecution’
claim. . . . [It] is simply a claim founded on a Fourth Amendment seizure that incorporates elements
of the analogous common law tort of malicious prosecution—specifically, the requirement that the prior
proceeding terminate favorably to the plaintiff.”); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–09 (6th Cir.
2010) (internal citations omitted) (stating malicious prosecution is a “separate constitutionally
cognizable claim” under the Fourth Amendment and a § 1983 plaintiff can establish this claim by
showing (1) “a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and that the defendant ‘ma[d]e,
influence[d], or participate[d] in the decision to prosecute;’” (2) “there was a lack of probable cause for
the criminal prosecution;” (3) “‘as a consequence of a legal proceeding,’ the plaintiff suffered a
‘deprivation of liberty;’” and (4) “the criminal proceeding must have been resolved in the plaintiff’s
favor”); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1288 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d
1556, 1561 (10th Cir. 1996)) (“[A]lthough the common law elements provide the ‘starting point’ for the
analysis of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the ultimate question is whether plaintiff can prove a
constitutional violation.”).
84. See, e.g., Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 953–54 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The initiation of
criminal charges without probable cause may set in force events that run afoul of . . . the Fourth
Amendment . . . . [A]nd some such claims may be made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Regardless, they are
not claims for malicious prosecution and labeling them as such only invites confusion.”); Kurtz v. City
of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Gunderson v. Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407, 409
(8th Cir. 1990)) (“[T]his court has uniformly held that malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable
under § 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury.”).
85. See Harris v. Village of Ford Heights, No. 17 C 4184, 2018 WL 2718029, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June
6, 2018) (explaining that prior to Manuel, the Seventh Circuit’s view was that state law malicious
prosecution claims foreclosed federal malicious prosecution claims, but the Supreme Court “called this
notion into question”). The Supreme Court in Manuel directed the Seventh Circuit to decide the
elements of a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment. Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 922
(“We leave consideration of this dispute to the Court of Appeals.”).
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“(1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the
defendant against the plaintiff; (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor
of the plaintiff; (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding;
and (4) actual malice.” 86 The Second Circuit requires a § 1983 plaintiff suing
for unlawful detention in New York to meet the same elements. 87 Like the
Second Circuit, the Tenth Circuit has continued to require a plaintiff to allege
actual malice to state a § 1983 claim for unlawful detention following Manuel. 88
Specifically, the Tenth Circuit noted that “Manuel did not address whether the
tort of malicious prosecution, as opposed to some other common law cause of
action, provides an appropriate framework for these Fourth Amendment § 1983
claims” and, accordingly, continued to rely on its own pre-Manuel precedent. 89
These courts reason that in the absence of federal common law, state tort law
governs. 90
Both courts and scholars have criticized the practice of importing state tort
law elements into § 1983’s constitutional element. Professor Sheldon Nahmod,
a leading scholar on § 1983, notes that requiring § 1983 plaintiffs to prove state
tort law elements “seriously under-protects constitutional rights because
plaintiffs who can show a deprivation of their constitutional rights by a state
actor causing compensable injury might nevertheless be unable to state a claim
if they cannot establish all of the common law elements of malicious
prosecution.” 91 Additionally, as Justice Alito points out in his dissenting
opinion, “[t]here is a severe mismatch between [malicious prosecution tort]

86. Mendez v. City of New York, 27 N.Y.S.3d 8, 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
87. Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338, 350 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Smith-Hunter v.
Harvey, 734 N.E.2d 750 (N.Y. 2000)).
88. See Margheim v. Buljko, 855 F.3d 1077, 1085 (10th Cir. 2017) (requiring the plaintiff to allege
(1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action
terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued
confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained
damages to state § 1983 Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim).
89. Id. at 1084 (applying Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008)).
90. Some courts have concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which directs district courts to apply state
law when federal laws “are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies,” applies
to § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a); see, e.g., Giles v. Campbell, 698 F.3d 153, 154–56 (3d Cir. 2012)
(holding Delaware survival law applied to prisoners’ § 1983 claims against corrections officers after one
officer died because the relevant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure did not outline what substantive law
applies when a party to the lawsuit dies); Pietrowski v. Town of Dibble, 134 F.3d 1006, 1008 (10th Cir.
1998) (concluding that an Oklahoma abatement statute applied to arrestee’s § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim because federal law failed to address whether claim abates when party to lawsuit
dies).
91. Brief for Sheldon H. Nahmod as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 16, Manuel v.
City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (No. 14-9496); see also Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 925 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“In some instances, importing a malice requirement into the Fourth Amendment would
leave culpable conduct unpunished. . . . In other cases, the malice requirement would cast too wide a
net.”).
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elements and the Fourth Amendment.” 92 Malice, a core element of malicious
prosecution, is a subjective standard while the Court has been clear that the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement is an objective standard. 93
Justice Alito concludes, quite appropriately, “[t]hese two standards—one
subjective and the other objective—cannot co-exist.” 94 Furthermore, Professor
Nahmod and Justice Alito both argue that malicious prosecution’s favorable
termination element undermines the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which
is to protect people from all unreasonable seizures, regardless of whether they
are charged and legal proceedings are initiated. 95 In short, there are strong
arguments against integrating state tort law elements into § 1983’s
constitutional inquiry. Yet, in practice, only three circuits have rejected all state
tort law elements in their constitutional analysis of § 1983 malicious prosecution
claims. 96
Despite all the various ways courts approach § 1983 unlawful detention
claims, there is one common denominator: each approach requires a plaintiff to
establish an absence of probable cause to prevail on a § 1983 Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution claim. 97 Furthermore, even if a plaintiff is
unable to establish a Fourth Amendment claim premised upon unlawful
detention, the plaintiff may prevail on a theory of false arrest. 98

92. Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 925.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 925–26 (arguing malicious prosecution’s favorable-termination element “makes no
sense” because “[t]he Fourth Amendment, after all, prohibits all unreasonable seizures—regardless of
whether a prosecution is ever brought or how a prosecution ends”); see Brief for Sheldon N. Nahmod
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 91, at 20 (“Making the termination of criminal
proceedings in favor of the accused a prerequisite for all § 1983 ‘malicious prosecution’ suits alleging
unlawful pretrial detention would contradict established precedents of this Court.”).
96. Three circuits have rejected the malice requirement but require the plaintiff to prove that
criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. See, e.g., Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor,
723 F.3d 91, 100–01 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (1st Cir. 2012))
(adopting a “purely constitutional approach” to § 1983 malicious prosecution claims and noting one
element of this approach is that “criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff’s favor”); Humbert v.
Mayor of Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting elements of malicious prosecution
case are “the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported
by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in [the] plaintiff’s favor”); King v.
Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 578–80 (6th Cir. 2017) (rejecting malice element but requiring plaintiff to
prove favorable termination). Although the Tenth Circuit has also rejected a common law approach to
a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the Tenth Circuit views the common law elements of
malicious prosecution as the starting point of the federal claim. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1288
(10th Cir. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir. 1996)) (“[A]lthough the
common law elements provide the ‘starting point’ for the analysis of a § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim, the ultimate question is whether plaintiff can prove a constitutional violation.”).
97. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
98. See infra Section I.B.2.
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2. Section 1983 “False Arrest” Claims
There is no question that when a person is arrested without probable cause,
they have a cognizable § 1983 claim. 99 Nevertheless, circuits are split regarding
which party bears the burden on the probable cause issue, with six placing the
burden on the plaintiff, three placing the burden on the defendant, and three
following the applicable state law. 100 Much of this confusion seems to be a
consequence of doctrines colliding. This section explains, quite simply, that
§ 1983 plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing the absence of probable cause
when they bring a Fourth Amendment “false arrest” claim. 101
In practice, when a police official arrests a person without probable cause,
the arrestee will have at least two claims: a state tort law claim for false arrest
(or false imprisonment) and a federal civil claim for deprivation of their Fourth
Amendment right. 102 In many jurisdictions, to prevail on the state law claim,
the plaintiff must simply prove that “(1) the defendant intended to confine him,
(2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not
consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise
privileged.” 103 The plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant lacked
probable cause; “[r]ather, the defendant may establish probable cause as an
absolute defense to the action.” 104
A federal claim based on a false arrest theory differs from a state tort law
claim in several respects. To state a viable § 1983 claim, a plaintiff is required
to plead two allegations: (1) that they were deprived of a federally protected
right, and (2) that the person who deprived them was a person acting under the
color of state law. 105 The plaintiff must also specifically identify the
constitutional right of which they were deprived. 106 Not surprisingly, plaintiffs
will usually ground § 1983 false arrest claims on the Fourth Amendment, which
99. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007) (acknowledging “a § 1983 claim seeking
damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment” and discussing the statute of
limitations for such a claim).
100. See Sarah Hughes Newman, Note, Proving Probable Cause: Allocating the Burden of Proof in False
Arrest Claims Under § 1983, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 347, 355–64 (2006).
101. See infra notes 121–29 and accompanying text.
102. Most states recognize the tort of false arrest or imprisonment. Some states recognize and treat
false arrest as a separate and distinct tort, although it is probably better understood as a subset of false
imprisonment claims. Under the law of torts, “[f]alse arrest . . . describes the setting for false
imprisonment when it is committed by an officer or by one who claims the power to make an arrest.”
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 45, § 4.14.
103. Wright v. Musanti, 887 F.3d 577, 587 (2d Cir. 2018).
104. Id. (citing Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2006)).
105. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Peterson v. Korobellis, No. 09-6571, 2010 WL
5464205, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2010).
106. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides
an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior,
‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for
analyzing these claims.’” (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989))).
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guarantees people the right to be free from an unreasonable search and
seizure. 107 To do so, a plaintiff must simply allege that there was an arrest and
that the arrest was made without probable cause. 108
Surprisingly, federal courts have not uniformly allocated burdens of
production and persuasion in these claims. Most circuits hold that a plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the defendant lacked probable cause. 109 However,
several circuits have suggested that the burden shifts from the plaintiff to the
defendant to show probable cause once the plaintiff “makes a prima facie case
of unlawful arrest,” which the plaintiff may do by showing that they were
arrested without a warrant. 110 The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove
there was evidence of probable cause. 111 This approach may be partially
attributable to a misappropriation of state common law. 112 Regardless, it
oversimplifies how burdens typically function in civil proceedings.
There are three types of “burdens” in civil litigation: (1) burden of
pleading, (2) burden of production, and (3) burden of persuasion. 113 The burden
of pleading refers to a party’s obligation to allege or raise a claim or defense. 114
For example, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure places the burden
of pleading the claim on the party seeking relief and the burden of pleading an
affirmative defense on the responding party. 115 The burdens of production and
persuasion are evidentiary burdens. 116 The burden of production dictates which
party must come forward and present or produce evidence in support of the
disputed claim or defense. 117 The party bearing the burden of persuasion must
107. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
108. See, e.g., Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that if
there was probable cause, the arresting officer is not liable under § 1983 for a false arrest).
109. See, e.g., Bogan v. City of Chicago, 644 F.3d 563, 570 n.4 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n this circuit,
we long have followed the rule that ‘a plaintiff claiming that he was arrested without probable cause
carries the burden of establishing the absence of probable cause.’” (quoting McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d
703, 706 (7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam))); see also Newman, supra note 100, at 358 (“The First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits place the burden on the plaintiff to prove lack of probable
cause . . . .”).
110. See, e.g., Dubner v. City of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Although the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the issue of unlawful arrest, she can make a prima facie case
simply by showing that the arrest was conducted without a valid warrant. At that point, the burden
shifts to the defendant to provide some evidence that the arresting officers had probable cause for a
warrantless arrest.”).
111. Id.
112. See Newman, supra note 100, at 362 (“[T]hese circuits place the burden of proof for probable
cause on the defendant based on their interpretation of Pierson, the common law, and policy
justifications.”).
113. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (noting that “burden of proof” is
composed of “burden of persuasion” and “burden of production”).
114. Id.
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)–(b).
116. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 56.
117. Id.

99 N.C. L REV. 379 (2021)

398

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

convince or persuade the factfinder of the truth of their allegation. 118 “[I]f the
evidence is evenly balanced, the party that bears the burden of persuasion must
lose.” 119
Furthermore, the burdens of production and persuasion usually follow the
burden of pleading. Put a bit differently, the party who bears the burden of
pleading a claim or defense also typically bears the burdens of production and
persuasion regarding that particular claim or defense. 120 Accordingly, a plaintiff
will usually bear the burden of pleading, production, and persuasion on all of
the elements of their case in chief, and a defendant will typically bear all three
burdens on all of the elements of their affirmative defenses. 121
Therefore, one could reasonably conclude that determining which party
bears the burden of proving the presence or absence of probable cause depends
on whether probable cause is viewed as an element of the plaintiff’s claim or as
a defense to a claim of false arrest. Although state common law may treat
probable cause as an affirmative defense to the tort of false arrest, under § 1983
jurisprudence, it should be an element of a § 1983 plaintiff’s case in chief. 122 As
previously mentioned, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that
the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived them of a federally
protected right. 123 In the context of a false arrest claim, the Fourth Amendment
is usually the right at issue. 124 Accordingly, the plaintiff must allege that they
were deprived of their Fourth Amendment right. 125 Furthermore, because the
Court has made clear that a warrantless arrest does not necessarily violate the
Fourth Amendment, 126 there is only one way to establish a Fourth Amendment
violation in this particular context: to establish the absence of probable cause. 127
Thus, the probable cause issue is a necessary element nestled into the plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment claim. 128 Accordingly, it makes little sense to assign a
§ 1983 defendant the burden of pleading or proving probable cause.
118. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S.
267, 274–75 (1994).
119. Id. at 272.
120. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 56–58.
121. See id. at 57.
122. See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
126. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (holding that a warrantless arrest
for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation, does not violate the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415 (1976).
127. Watson, 423 U.S. at 417.
128. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. To be clear, there are some types of Fourth Amendment claims,
like excessive force, where a § 1983 plaintiff does not have to establish that the police lacked probable
cause. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (“[A]ll claims that law enforcement
officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or
other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its
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Except for those few circuits that follow state common law, most circuits
recognize that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the
factfinder that the defendant lacked probable cause in § 1983 cases alleging false
arrest. 129 Nevertheless, a few circuits have adopted a burden-shifting framework
to resolve evidentiary disputes of probable cause. 130 For example, in Martin v.
Duffie, 131 the Tenth Circuit held that a plaintiff established a prima facie case
for his Fourth Amendment false arrest claim “by showing arrest and
confinement without a warrant and without other justification.” 132 Once the
plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden passes to the defendant to produce
evidence of probable cause. 133 It is important to recognize that even when courts
adopt a burden shifting framework, the burden of persuasion remains with the
plaintiff at all times. 134 Only the burden of production shifts between the
plaintiff and defendant. 135
Clearly, probable cause is an integral element of any § 1983 false arrest
claim. If the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the arrestee
committed a crime, the arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment, and,
accordingly, there is no § 1983 liability under this particular theory. 136
Regardless of whether § 1983 plaintiffs frame their claims as a false arrest or
false detention claim, they should bear the burden of proving a Fourth
Amendment violation. To prevail in this particular context, they will have to
prove that the police lacked probable cause to arrest and/or detain them. 137 In
many cases, a criminal court will have already determined this exact point: the
police lacked probable cause to arrest and detain the arrestee. Part II considers
whether § 1983 plaintiffs may rely on the earlier criminal case to prove this
element of their false arrest and false detention claims.

‘reasonableness’ standard.”). But in false arrest and false detention cases, the lack of probable cause is
precisely what gives rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.
Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (citing Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354) (“A warrantless arrest is reasonable if the officer
has probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a crime in the officer’s presence.”).
129. See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Dubner v. City of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2001).
131. 463 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1972).
132. Id. at 469.
133. Id.
134. Id. (“Ultimately plaintiff had what is often described as the risk of nonpersuasion on the issue
of lack of probable cause.”).
135. See id.
136. To state a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1)
that there was an arrest and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause. Dowling v. City of
Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988). If there was probable cause, the arresting officer is not
liable under § 1983 for a false arrest. See Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Because
probable cause to arrest constitutes justification, there can be no claim for false arrest where the
arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.”); Peterson v. Korobellis, No. 09-6571, 2010
WL 5464205, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2010).
137. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 918 (2017).
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II. THE PRECLUSION DOCTRINES
For most Civil Procedure professors, the mere mention of “prior
litigation” conjures up three related doctrines: issue preclusion, claim
preclusion, and full faith and credit. A basic prerequisite for all three is litigation
across cases. Claim preclusion, which prevents a plaintiff from litigating a claim
that should have been brought in an earlier action, 138 is largely irrelevant to this
Article. However, issue preclusion and intra-jurisdiction application through
the full faith and credit doctrine are central to this Article.
Issue preclusion and full faith and credit are closely related doctrines. Issue
preclusion, a common law doctrine, prevents a party from litigating an issue in
the second case that was already litigated in the first case. 139 The Full Faith and
Credit Clause is a bit broader, requiring that states follow and effectuate “the
public acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” 140
Accordingly, if a court in one state has found that the police lacked probable
cause to arrest a suspect, the Full Faith and Credit Clause would seem to require
every other state to honor that decision. Notably, however, Article IV of the
Constitution only applies to the states. 141 The Full Faith and Credit Act applies
equally to state and federal courts. 142 Combined, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Act ensure that (with some exceptions) a
state court’s proceedings will be honored by both state and federal courts in the
United States.
Section 1983 jurisprudence intertwines the Full Faith and Credit Act and
state issue preclusion rules. 143 As just noted, the Full Faith and Credit Act

138. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Preclusion has a long history rooted in common
law. 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403 (2d ed. 2002). Interestingly, though, claim preclusion and issue
preclusion have different origins. Alexandra Bursak, Note, Preclusions, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1651, 1653
(2016). Historically, res judicata, or claim preclusion, was “a nuclear, private right, limited only to the
two parties of the first adjudication.” Id. at 1662. In contrast, issue preclusion “began as a tool of judicial
legitimacy and became a means of achieving efficiency,” promising “broad protection for litigants
threatened by vexatious and repetitive suits.” Id. at 1663.
139. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94.
140. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also Katherine C. Pearson, Common Law Preclusion, Full Faith
and Credit, and Consent Judgments: The Analytical Challenge, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 419, 441–47 (1999)
(“Full faith and credit has been interpreted as federalizing the application of claim and issue
preclusion.”).
141. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986) (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause is of
course not binding on federal courts . . . .”).
142. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1738, 62 Stat. 869, 947 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738) (“[R]ecords and judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States . . . .”); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373
(1996) (noting that § 1738 “directs all courts to treat a state-court judgment with the same respect that
it would receive in the courts of the rendering State”).
143. See infra Section II.A.
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requires federal courts to follow state court determinations. 144 The Supreme
Court, however, has taken this a step further and held that the Full Faith and
Credit Act requires “all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state court
judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged
would do so.” 145 Accordingly, the relevant question is: Would the State preclude
the parties from relitigating the issue?
Preclusion rules have the potential to impact subsequent § 1983 litigation
regarding unlawful arrests and detention in two obvious ways. When the
criminal proceedings end in a determination that the government official had
probable cause to believe the suspect committed a crime, the § 1983 defendant
may argue that the suspect—now the civil plaintiff—is prohibited from
relitigating this issue in the civil proceeding. 146 This means the plaintiff will lose
their § 1983 unlawful arrest and detention claim. 147 On the other hand, when
the criminal proceedings have ended in a determination that probable cause was
lacking, the plaintiff, formerly the criminal defendant, may argue that the
defense is precluded from challenging this conclusion. This offensive use of
issue preclusion would bind the civil court to the prior conclusion, which means
the plaintiff is spared the burdens of proving this element of their § 1983
claim. 148 Thus, it is important to understand what issue preclusion rules govern
§ 1983 litigation.
A.

Issue Preclusion in § 1983 Litigation

Viewed entirely through the lens of the Full Faith and Credit Act, the
issue seems clear—courts litigating § 1983 claims of false arrest are bound by
the criminal courts’ prior probable cause determination. Unfortunately, the
Court created a far more complicated framework for determining the effect of
prior litigation on later § 1983 claims in Allen v. McCurry 149 by linking the Full
Faith and Credit Act to state preclusion rules. 150

144. § 1738, 62 Stat. at 947.
145. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
146. See, e.g., Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 383 (2d Cir. 1986); Autrey v. Stair, 512 F. App’x
572, 576 (6th Cir. 2013); Buttino v. City of Hamtramck, 87 F. App’x 499, 499–500 (6th Cir. 2004);
Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 285 (9th Cir. 1994).
147. As explained in Part I, if the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the arrestee
committed a crime, the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment and there is no § 1983 liability.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
148. Of course, the plaintiff would have to prove the other elements of their § 1983 claim, but they
would be freed from proving this central element.
149. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
150. See id. at 96.
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In 1980, the Supreme Court first addressed the question of issue
preclusion in § 1983 litigation in Allen. 151 In April 1977, Willie McCurry was
arrested after a gunfight with several undercover officers. 152 Following his
surrender, the officers entered McCurry’s residence without a warrant,
allegedly to search for other persons. 153 While there, the officers seized drugs
and contraband they found in plain view as well as drugs and contraband hidden
in drawers and in auto tires on the porch. 154 “At the pretrial suppression hearing,
the trial judge excluded the evidence seized from the dresser drawers and tires,
but denied suppression of the evidence found in plain view.” 155
Following his conviction, McCurry brought a § 1983 action against two
named police officers, several unnamed police officials, the city of St. Louis,
and its police department, alleging, among other things, that the search of the
drawers and tires deprived him of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
an unreasonable seizure. 156 From there, things got a bit odd. The defendants
moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that McCurry was precluded
from relitigating the lawfulness of the search. 157 The peculiarity of this is that
at the suppression hearing the criminal judge suppressed some of the
evidence—a clear indication that at least some portion of the search was
unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, the
defendants seemed to disregard this adverse finding against them and
characterized the search as lawful. 158 And the district court followed suit,
granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and noting that “the
only issue in the instant lawsuit [is] whether the entrance into plaintiff’s home
and the resulting search was lawful [and] was litigated on the merits at his
criminal trial in state court and determined adversely to his position.” 159 From
this, the district court concluded that the plaintiff was “collaterally estopped
from relitigating the constitutionality of the search.” 160
151. Id. at 91 (explaining that the issue before the Court was “whether the unavailability of federal
habeas corpus prevented the police officers from raising the state courts’ partial rejection of McCurry’s
constitutional claim as a collateral estoppel defense to the § 1983 suit against them for damages”).
152. Id. at 92.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Brief for Respondent at 2–4, Allen, 449 U.S. 90 (No. 79-935) (alleging that his
constitutional rights had been infringed when (1) the police officers conspired to conduct an illegal
search of his home, (2) his home was illegally searched, and (3) he was assaulted by police officers upon
being arrested).
157. McCurry v. Allen, 466 F. Supp. 514, 515 (E.D. Mo. 1978), rev’d, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979),
rev’d, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 515–16. On appeal, McCurry argued that “even if the doctrine of collateral estoppel
generally applies to this case, he should be able to proceed to trial to obtain damages for the part of the
seizure declared illegal by the state courts.” Allen, 449 U.S. at 93 n.2.
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McCurry appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
“whether the rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel are generally applicable
to § 1983 actions.” 161 Specifically, McCurry argued that he should have an
opportunity to relitigate the criminal judge’s conclusion that the search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. 162 He reasoned that federal courts should not
be bound by the state court’s determination because “Congress enacted this
legislation to provide a federal forum for litigants in respondent’s position to
protect their federally guaranteed constitutional rights.” 163 The Supreme Court
rejected McCurry’s argument, holding instead that “Congress has specifically
required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state court judgments
whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do
so.” 164 In other words, if courts in the state where the first case was decided
would preclude a party from relitigating the issue, then courts in the second
case should do the same, even if the first court was a state court and the second
a federal court. 165 And, of course, “the common law of preclusion by judgment
is not uniform among the states, with some states following modern trends and
other states adhering to mutuality and similarly strict prerequisites.” 166
B.

Issue Preclusion in the States

Although state issue preclusion rules are not identical, they share some
common characteristics. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments explains:
“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether
on the same or a different claim.” 167 Dissected, there are four basic
requirements: (1) the issue must be actually litigated, (2) the issue must be
determined by a valid and final judgment, (3) the determination must have been
essential to the judgment, and (4) the action is between the same parties who

161. Allen, 449 U.S. at 96.
162. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 156, at 7–8.
163. Id. at 10.
164. Allen, 449 U.S. at 96.
165. Pearson, supra note 140, at 442 (“Because of the relationship between preclusion principles
and full faith and credit, the Supreme Court often has emphasized that the ‘first step’ in analyzing an
enforcement question involving full faith and credit is to determine the rendering state’s law on claim
and issue preclusion.”).
Let us return to the example offered in the introduction: a New York City district attorney
prosecutes an arrestee for resisting arrest and the New York judge determines the officer lacked
probable cause for the arrest. See supra p. 102 and note 6. Now let’s assume the arrestee brings a § 1983
suit against the officer in a New Jersey federal court (perhaps because the officer resides there). Under
the Court’s holding in Allen, the federal court in New Jersey is to apply New York state issue preclusion
rules to determine whether to give the New York criminal court’s conclusion preclusive effect.
166. Pearson, supra note 140, at 443.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. L. INST. 1982).
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litigated the initial action. 168 If just one of these requirements is missing, that
issue will need to be relitigated in the subsequent case. For example, if the
criminal defendant pleads guilty or the prosecutor drops the charges, then the
matter hasn’t been litigated and there is no valid final judgment. Similarly, if
the criminal defendant prevails on other grounds, a court will likely conclude
that the probable cause issue determination was not essential to the judgment.
The preclusion element that is easily the most cumbersome for criminal cases
turned civil is the same-party requirement.
C.

Issue Preclusion’s “Same Party” Requirement

Historically, issue preclusion rules required that the two cases be “between
the same parties.” 169 “Under this mutuality doctrine, neither party could use a
prior judgment as an estoppel against the other unless both parties were bound
by the judgment.” 170 For example, if Plaintiff sues Defendant A for patent
infringement and the court finds that Plaintiff did not have a valid patent,
Plaintiff could later sue Defendant B for infringing the same patent, and
Defendant B would not be able to claim that Plaintiff was precluded from
relitigating the issue. 171 “[T]he mutuality requirement provided a party who had
litigated and lost in a previous action an opportunity to relitigate identical issues
with new parties.” 172 In short, so long as they had not been a party to the original
suit, either party could overcome the argument that they were precluded from
litigating the issue by relying on the mutuality doctrine. The mutuality
doctrine, however, eventually yielded to concerns of judicial efficiency.
The Supreme Court recognized the defensive use of issue preclusion in
1971 in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation. 173
Specifically, the Court held that a plaintiff could be precluded from litigating a
claim against a new defendant that the plaintiff previously litigated and lost. 174
Accordingly, Defendant B, referenced in the preceding paragraph, would be
able to assert issue preclusion against Plaintiff, and so the court would preclude
Plaintiff from relitigating the issue if they had fully litigated the issue against
Defendant A.

168. See id.
169. See 1 A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 418 (Edward W. Tuttle
ed., 5th ed. 1925). However, in its earliest form and well into the eighteenth century, “[u]nlike res
judicata, which tied the identity of a claim to the party who brought it, estoppel looked to the judicial
record as the authoritative source of preclusion.” Bursak, supra note 138, at 1665.
170. Parklane Hoisery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326–27 (1979).
171. See, e.g., id. at 327–28 (describing a similar scenario).
172. Id. at 327.
173. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
174. Id. at 329.
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Then, eight years later in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 175 the Court
recognized that in certain limited circumstances a plaintiff who had not
previously been party to a suit could assert issue preclusion against a
defendant. 176 The Court reasoned that because the defendant had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate its claims in the earlier action, it was precluded from
relitigating the issue in a second action. 177 The Court pointed out that issue
preclusion has a dual purpose: to protect litigants from the burden of relitigating
an identical issue with the same party or their privy and to promote judicial
economy by preventing needless litigation. 178 Specifically, the Court concluded
that “the preferable approach for dealing with these problems in the federal
courts is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant
trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be applied.” 179 The
Court advised trial courts to consider the following factors: (1) ease with which
plaintiff could have joined the first case; 180 (2) foreseeability of future litigation
and incentive for defendant to vigorously defend the first case; 181 (3) whether
there have been inconsistent judgments in prior cases; and (4) whether different
procedures apply in cases which, amongst other things, may have denied the
defendant a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first case and
might have resulted in inconsistent judgments. 182 It is noteworthy that Parklane

175. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
176. Id. at 337. In Parklane, Shore brought a class action civil suit against Parklane alleging that
Parklane had issued a materially false and misleading proxy statement in connection with a merger. Id.
at 324. According to the complaint, Parklane’s proxy statement had violated numerous sections of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and various rules and regulations promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Id. Before Shore’s lawsuit came to trial, the SEC filed suit against the same
defendants, alleging that the proxy statement issued by Parklane was materially false and misleading
in essentially the same respects as those that had been alleged in Shore’s complaint. Id. In the SEC
case, after a four-day trial, the court found that the Parklane proxy statement was materially false and
misleading in the respects alleged and entered a declaratory judgment to that effect. Id. at 324–25. In
the second case, Shore moved for partial summary judgment against Parklane, alleging that Parklane
was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues that had been resolved against it in the earlier
action brought by the SEC. Id. at 325.
177. Id. at 332–33.
178. Id. at 326.
179. Id. at 331.
180. Id. Parklane suggests that where a plaintiff had the opportunity to join the first case but did
not, the use of offensive collateral estoppel should be barred. In terms of policy, it would be unfair for
a plaintiff to rely on a previous judgment against the defendant but not be bound by a judgment in
favor of the defendant. This would promote a “wait and see” approach and subsequently lead to an
increase in litigation.
181. Id. at 332 (reasoning that the foreseeability of private suits following a government judgment
should have made Parklane litigate the prior SEC lawsuit “fully and vigorously”). If future suits are
not foreseeable to a defendant, then the defendant has less incentive to defend earnestly in the first
case. Id.
182. Id.
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concerned two civil cases, both of which were initiated in federal district
courts. 183
Parklane demonstrates, as a general matter, how the mutuality doctrine has
eroded over time. Importantly, Parklane’s preclusion rules do not apply to
§ 1983 Fourth Amendment claims in which the plaintiff wants to rely on an
earlier state criminal court disposition. 184 As McCurry makes clear, a federal
court must apply the relevant state preclusion rules when a § 1983 plaintiff
wants to rely on a prior state court decision. 185 Thus, state law, not federal law,
will govern preclusion decisions in most § 1983 claims that allege an absence of
probable cause unless the § 1983 plaintiff was prosecuted in federal court. 186
Nevertheless, today, most states follow the rule outlined in Parklane,
allowing a litigant who was not a party to the original suit to assert issue
preclusion against a litigant who was party to the original suit. More
specifically, twenty states have rejected a requirement of mutuality for issue
preclusion altogether. 187 Accordingly, a party who did not participate in the
183. Id. at 324. But see United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158–64 (1984) (holding that the
government was exempt from the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel). In Mendoza, the
Supreme Court distinguished the case at bar from Parklane, noting that “the party against whom the
estoppel is sought is the United States.” Id. at 159. The Court ultimately held “that nonmutual offensive
collateral estoppel simply does not apply against the Government in such a way as to preclude
relitigation of issues such as those involved in this case.” Id. at 162. However, the Court did note that
“[t]he concerns underlying our disapproval of collateral estoppel against the Government are for the
most part inapplicable where mutuality is present.” Id. at 163–64.
184. Federal common law—Parklane—applies when a party wants to rely on a prior federal court
judgment. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (“The preclusive effect of a federal-court
judgment is determined by federal common law.”).
185. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97–98 (1980).
186. Id. at 96 (“Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to
state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do
so.”).
187. See, e.g., Johnson v. Union Pac. R.R., 104 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Ark. 2003) (stating that claim
preclusion does not require mutuality of parties before the doctrine is applicable); Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co. v. Jones, 596 A.2d 414, 422–23 (Conn. 1991) (same); Columbia Cas. Co. v. Playtex FP, Inc., 584
A.2d 1214, 1217 (Del. 1991) (same); Exotics Haw.-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 90
P.3d 250, 263 (Haw. 2004) (expanding collateral estoppel and recognizing nonmutual offensive issue
preclusion); Moore v. Cabinet for Hum. Res., 954 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Ky. 1997) (“Thus, the Court
abandoned the mutuality requirement of res judicata in adopting non-mutual collateral estoppel,
applicable when at least the party to be bound is the same party in the prior action.”); Hossler v. Barry,
403 A.2d 762, 766 (Me. 1979) (“[T]he doctrine of mutuality of estoppel should no longer govern the
application of collateral estoppel in the courts of this State.”); Commonwealth v. Stephens, 885 N.E.2d
785, 791 (Mass. 2008) (“Historically, mutuality of the parties was required in order for collateral
estoppel to apply, a requirement now abandoned in civil cases.” (citation omitted)); Aufderhar v. Data
Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. 1990) (stating mutuality is not required for issue
preclusion); Marcum v. Miss. Valley Gas Co., 672 So. 2d 730, 733 (Miss. 1996) (same); Peterson v.
Neb. Nat. Gas Co., 281 N.W.2d 525, 527 (Neb. 1979) (same); Paradise Palms Cmty. Ass’n v. Paradise
Homes, 505 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1973) (recognizing many courts have abandoned mutuality
requirement and limited requirement of privity to party against whom res judicata is asserted and
adopting that standard for collateral estoppel); Cutter v. Town of Durham, 411 A.2d 1120, 1121 (N.H.
1980) (expressing mutuality is not essential); State v. Gonzalez, 380 A.2d 1128, 1133 (N.J. 1977) (same);
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original action may still preclude someone who was a party to the original action
from relitigating an issue decided in the original case. Sixteen states and the
District of Columbia, however, have developed their own tests to determine
when it is appropriate to preclude a defendant from relitigating an issue that
had been unfavorable to them in an earlier state action. 188 For example, the
District of Columbia requires a litigant who wishes to assert nonmutual
offensive issue preclusion against another litigant to satisfy a two-part inquiry,
which requires the trial court to consider the fairness of precluding the party
from relitigating the issue. 189 Similarly, under Illinois law, courts are to apply a
fairness inquiry. 190 Alternatively, some states are willing to relax the mutuality
requirement for defensive use of collateral estoppel. 191 Interestingly, Louisiana
Silva v. State, 745 P.2d 380, 384 (N.M. 1987) (same); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198
(N.Y. 1967) (same); Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnold, 502 S.W.3d 102, 115 (Tenn. 2016) (same); Trepanier
v. Getting Organized, Inc., 583 A.2d 583, 588 (Vt. 1990) (same); Walden v. Hoke, 429 S.E.2d 504,
508 (W. Va. 1993) (same); Sumpter ex rel. Michelle T. v. Crozier, 495 N.W.2d 327, 331 (Wis. 1993)
(same); Tex. W. Oil & Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857, 864 (Wyo. 1987),
aff’d, 749 P.2d 278 (Wyo. 1988) (same).
188. Sixteen states, as well as the District of Columbia, permit offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion, usually after certain conditions are met or if principles of fairness justify its use. See, e.g.,
Briggs v. Newton, 984 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Alaska 1999) (asserting different conditions to be met to invoke
nonmutual issue preclusion); Vandenberg v. Superior Ct., 982 P.2d 229, 237 (Cal. 1999) (same); Cent.
Bank Denver, N.A. v. Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson, Att’ys at L., 940 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Colo.
App. 1997) (same); Modiri v. 1342 Rest. Grp., Inc., 904 A.2d 391, 395 (D.C. 2006) (same); Anderson
v. City of Pocatello, 731 P.2d 171, 178–79 (Idaho 1986) (same), aff’d on reh’g, 731 P.2d 171 (Idaho 1987);
Herzog v. Lexington, 657 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Ill. 1995) (same); Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121,
125 (Ind. 1994) (same); Fischer v. City of Sioux City, 654 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2002) (same);
Garrity v. Md. State Bd. of Plumbing, 135 A.3d 452, 458–63 (Md. 2016) (recognizing Maryland had
recognized defensive use for years but was long unsettled as to offensive use, and affirming the
offensive use in specific case where certain elements were met); James v. Paul, 49 S.W.3d 678, 684–
85 (Mo. 2001) (stating certain factors must be considered before nonmutual issue preclusion will
apply); Shannon v. Moffett, 604 P.2d 407, 411 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (same); Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d
872, 874 (Pa. 1996) (quoting Safeguard Mut. Ins. v. Williams, 345 A.2d 664, 668 (Pa. 1975)) (same);
Providence Tchrs. Union v. McGovern, 319 A.2d 358, 361 (R.I. 1974) (same); Graham v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Ins., 287 S.E.2d 495, 496 (S.C. 1982) (same); Eagle Props., Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807
S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1990) (same); State v. Mullin-Coston, 95 P.3d 321, 324 (Wash. 2004) (same).
189. Modiri, 904 A.2d at 395.
190. Herzog, 657 N.E.2d at 930 (noting the court previously stated that “circuit courts must have
broad discretion to ensure that application of offensive collateral estoppel is not fundamentally unfair
to the defendant, even though the threshold requirements for collateral estoppel are otherwise
satisfied”).
191. Four states have abandoned the mutuality requirement for defensive issue preclusion but have
not yet recognized it with regard to offensive issue preclusion. See Wetzel v. Ariz. State Real Est.
Dep’t., 727 P.2d 825, 828–29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (approving of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
but noting the mutuality requirement has been abandoned for defensive use of the doctrine); Anco
Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Swank, 524 P.2d 7, 13 (Okla. 1974) (same); Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v.
Felco Jewel Indus., 336 N.W.2d 153, 159 (S.D. 1983) (“We now join those jurisdictions which have
allowed the use of collateral estoppel or res judicata in a civil action when a new defendant affirmatively
raises these defenses to bar a plaintiff from reasserting issues the plaintiff has actually previously
litigated and lost on the merits against another defendant.”); Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc.,
16 P.3d 1214, 1224 (Utah 2000) (“[I]ssue preclusion applies even if only ‘the party against whom the
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rejected the use of collateral estoppel and res judicata entirely until 1991, when
the legislature passed a statute recognizing res judicata. Now, Louisiana requires
that “the party against whom the collateral estoppel would be applied generally
must either have been a party, or privy to a party, in the prior litigation.” 192
Seven states still require mutuality of parties, either requiring the same party
or a party in privity. 193 In short, states approach issue preclusion differently
when a person who wasn’t a party to the original suit wishes to use a previously
litigated issue against a defendant who was a party to the earlier suit.
Regardless of whether a party proceeds under state or federal preclusion
rules or which state rule applies, a party generally will only be able to assert
issue preclusion against a person or entity that was the same party involved in
the original litigation. In other words, a nonparty will not be precluded from
relitigating an issue that was decided in the initial case. This, of course, raises
the following question: Does a party qualify as the same party or a nonparty?
In Taylor v. Sturgell, 194 the Supreme Court addressed “the rule against nonparty preclusion.” 195 Like all issue preclusion claims, Taylor involved two
different lawsuits. 196 In the first, Greg Herrick brought a lawsuit against the
Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) to obtain records. 197 He lost. 198
Then, less than one month later, Brent Taylor, Herrick’s friend, brought a

[doctrine] is asserted [was] a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.’” (quoting
Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988))).
192. Chastant v. Chastant, 2013-1402, p. 8 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/23/14); 138 So. 3d 801, 807 (citing
Terrell v. DeConna, 877 F.2d 1267, 1270 (5th Cir. 1989)). See generally LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231
(Westlaw through the 2020 2d Extraordinary Sess.) (defining res judicata as “a valid and final judgment
. . . between the same parties”); St. Paul Mercury Ins. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 436 (5th Cir.
2000) (recognizing that a state statute superseded Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So. 2d 154,
156–57 (La. 1978)).
193. See Suggs v. Ala. Power Co., 123 So. 2d 4, 6 (Ala. 1960) (“[I]n order for the judgment in the
prior suit to render the question in a subsequent suit res adjudicata, the same issues of fact must have
been involved, within issues pleaded or which ought to have been litigated, between the same parties
or privies, and applied to the parties or privies at the time of the rendition of that judgment.” (quoting
H.G. Hill Co. v. Taylor, 174 So. 481, 484 (Ala. 1937)); Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 919
(Fla. 1995) (same); Minnifield v. Wells Fargo Bank, 771 S.E.2d 188, 192 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (requiring
mutuality of collateral estoppel); N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Nash Oil & Gas, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 520, 528
(D. Kan. 2007) (applying Kansas state law); Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d
380, 384 (N.D. 1992) (“For purposes of both res judicata and collateral estoppel in this state, only
parties or their privies may take advantage of or be bound by the former judgment.”); Goodson v.
McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978, 981 (Ohio 1983) (espousing that the general rule is
that issue preclusion requires mutuality); Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 (Va.
1987) (same).
194. 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
195. Id. at 893.
196. Id. at 885 (explaining Brent Taylor filed an action seeking documents from the FAA after his
friend Greg Herrick had previously brought an unsuccessful suit seeking the same records).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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lawsuit against the FAA seeking the same records. 199 The question in the case
was whether Herrick should be treated as the same party as Taylor and,
accordingly, precluded from relitigating the issue previously decided against
Taylor. 200 This might be best understood as a two-fold question: whether
Taylor and Herrick are, in fact, the same party and, if not, whether the court
should nevertheless treat them as the same party.
Not surprisingly, the case turned on the second issue: whether the court
should treat Taylor and Herrick as the same party (nobody suggested they were
actually the same party, simply that they should be treated as such). 201 Relying
on the Eighth Circuit decision Tyus v. Schoemehl, 202 the trial court held that
Taylor was precluded from relitigating the issue that Herrick previously lost
because Taylor qualified as Herrick’s “virtual representative.” 203 The Supreme
Court disagreed. The Court recognized several circumstances in which a party
should be treated as the same party. The six exceptions the Court recognized
are: (1) the party agrees to be bound, (2) the party has preexisting substantive
legal relationship with a party in the original, (3) the party was adequately
represented by someone with the same interests who was a party in the original
action, (4) the party assumed control over the prior litigation, (5) the party is
relitigating through a proxy, and (6) some special statutory scheme expressly
forecloses successive litigation by nonlitigants. 204 However, the Court refused
to extend this list to include “virtual representation.” 205
To be clear, nonparty collateral estoppel may take two forms: (1) a
nonparty may attempt to preclude a party to the earlier litigation from
relitigating a point (for example, Parklane); 206 or (2) a party may attempt to
preclude a person who was not party to the first case from relitigating a point
that was decided in that case (for example, Taylor). 207 Here, the issue is not
whether a nonparty may assert issue preclusion against a person who was a party
to the previous suit—the § 1983 plaintiff clearly was a party to in the original

199. Id. The D.C. Circuit held that Taylor could not bring the case because there was “virtual
representation” between Herrick in the first case and Taylor in the second. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 905.
202. 93 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 1996), overruled by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
203. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 888 (explaining that the trial court granted summary judgment to Fairchild
and FAA because Taylor’s suit was barred by claim preclusion. Even though Taylor was not the same
party, the court found Taylor was virtually represented in the first lawsuit brought by Herrick). The
virtual representation doctrine is “[t]he principle that a judgment may bind a person who is not a party
to the litigation if one of the parties is so closely aligned with the nonparty's interests that the nonparty
has been adequately represented by the party in court.” Virtual Representation Doctrine, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
204. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 888.
205. Id. at 895–96.
206. See supra notes 175–84 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 194–205 and accompanying text.
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criminal action. Courts consistently allow § 1983 defendants who were not
named parties in the original action to assert issue preclusion arguments against
§ 1983 plaintiffs who were the criminal defendant in the original case. Rather,
the question at the heart of this Article is whether to treat the defendants in
§ 1983 probable cause actions as the same party that prosecuted the criminal
proceeding, which would allow the § 1983 plaintiff to preclude them from
rearguing the probable cause determination. There is little question that the
civil defendants were not parties in the criminal case—the criminal case is
between the state and criminal defendant—yet there is a very strong argument
that they should be treated as though they were parties in the criminal case.
III. PARTY, PURPOSE, AND PRECLUSION
Section 1983 litigation is bound to questions of public identity. In virtually
all claims alleging a constitutional deprivation, the public identity inquiry is
twofold: first, whether to classify the defendant as a state or local official 208 and
second, whether the defendant was acting “‘under color of’ state law.” 209 Under
current jurisprudence, the same-party requirement can be conceptually
challenging in the context of municipal liability and municipal entities and,
more specifically, whether these defendants should be considered the same
party as the prosecutor charged with litigating the criminal case. Section III.A
discusses the most relevant actors in both the criminal and civil cases. Section
III.B explains how courts classify these actors. Section III.C offers a normative
conception of the relationship between criminal prosecutors and civil
defendants in § 1983 probable cause litigation. Specifically, we argue that, given
their shared public character, when a § 1983 plaintiff sues a municipality or
police officials for an arrest without probable cause, courts should presume
same-party status amongst the defendants and the district attorney who
prosecuted the criminal case.
A.

The Parties

As is always the case with issue preclusion, the litigation contemplated by
this Article involves two cases. The first case is the criminal case, brought by
the state against the defendant. The second case is the civil case brought by the
§ 1983 plaintiff against the police or the municipality. At first glance, criminal
208. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 789 (1997) (considering whether a sheriff
should be classified as a state or local official).
209. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,
326 (1941)) (concluding that government officials act under color of state law even when they misuse
their power), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
Despite the similarity in phrasing, these are two very different questions. A police official may not act
under color of state law, but, nevertheless, a court may classify the official as a local, rather than state,
officer.
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and civil litigation seem to assume very different postures. Yet, as explored
below, there is one thing that all criminal cases and § 1983 claims have in
common—a governmental actor or entity will be a party to the suit.
Criminal law is often understood to punish wrongs against the public
generally. 210 This is reflected in the parties to a criminal case. Although crimes
often have victims, the suit is between the state and the criminal defendant
rather than between the victim and the perpetrator. Furthermore, by labeling
something criminal, we legitimize the public prosecution of the crime and
empower the state, through a prosecutor, to act on behalf of the public against
the accused. 211 In a criminal action, the state is represented by a prosecutor.
In the criminal case, the litigation is between “the State” or “the People”
and a private defendant. Ironically, one of the primary actors in the criminal
case—the prosecutor—will be wholly absent from future civil litigation, even
when prosecutorial decisions caused or contributed to the constitutional
deprivations. This is because district attorneys enjoy prosecutorial immunity. 212
And as if prosecutorial immunity does not offer sufficient protection, sovereign
immunity offers prosecutors an additional shield from liability. 213
Consequently, when civil plaintiffs bring a Fourth Amendment § 1983
action, they often will sue the police involved in the arrest and detention, as
well as the municipality that employs them. 214 The civil case may appear very
different from the criminal case, but upon closer examination there are clearly
shared elements. First, both the criminal defendant and civil plaintiff may allege
a Fourth Amendment violation although they seek different remedies. The
criminal defendant wants the evidence suppressed while the civil plaintiff seeks
monetary or injunctive relief. Additionally, in both criminal and civil cases, the
opposing party is the government or an official acting under the color of state
law. The problem is that the shift in parties between the criminal and civil
litigation complicates questions of mutuality in issue preclusion disputes. The
210. Ambrose Y.K. Lee, Public Wrongs and the Criminal Law, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 155, 155 (2015).
211. Id. at 158 (“To say that a wrong properly concerns the public . . . implies that the public
community, or more concretely the state as embodying and acting on behalf of the public, may
permissibly take actions in response to it . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
212. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997) (“[T]he prosecutor is fully protected by absolute
immunity when performing the traditional functions of an advocate.”).
213. See, e.g., Brown v. U.S. Postal Inspection Serv., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1254 (S.D. Tex. 2016)
(noting that when state law classifies prosecutors as state actors, sovereign immunity bars suits against
them).
214. See, e.g., Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 916 (2017); Morfin v. City of East Chicago,
349 F.3d 989, 994–95 (7th Cir. 2003); Dawson v. Jackson, 748 F. App’x 298, 299 (11th Cir. 2018).
Unlike prosecutors who may plead absolute immunity, police officials may only plead qualified
immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“[G]overnment officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”). Municipalities are not entitled to any form of immunity. See Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).
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first case is between the state (represented by the prosecutor) and the criminal
defendant while the second case is between the former criminal defendant and
the municipality and individual officers. One party is clearly the same—the
criminal defendant/civil plaintiff; the question is whether the governmental
entities—the prosecutor, the municipality, and local police officials—should be
presumed to be the same party across the cases. 215
B.

State, Local, or Private Individual

Liability in § 1983 litigation can easily turn on whether a defendant is
classified as a state official, a municipal official, or a person acting in a private
capacity. If the court classifies the defendant as a state official, they will have
sovereign immunity for actions seeking monetary relief. 216 Similarly, if the
court finds that the defendant was acting in a private capacity, then the plaintiff
will not be able to meet the requirement that the defendant acted under the
color of state law. 217 Thus, the public identity issue in § 1983 actions is twofold:
first, whether to classify the defendant as a state or local official and second,
whether the defendant was acting under color of state law. 218
How courts label the parties sets the stage for preclusion determinations—
prosecutors are labeled “state actors” when they file charges and argue
suppression motions. 219 On the other hand, municipalities and local police are
“local” characters. 220 Given these characterizations there is an obvious argument
that courts should not treat them as the same party in issue preclusion disputes.
This section considers the governmental identity of the various actors.
Whether to classify a local prosecutor as a state or local entity is a
complicated question. In many respects a local prosecutor is a state official. 221
215. There is little question that the civil plaintiff was a party in the criminal disposition.
216. Stephen R. McAllister & Peyton H. Robinson, The Potential Civil Liability of Law Enforcement
Officers and Agencies, 67 KAN. B. ASS’N 14, 22 (1998).
217. Id.
218. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
219. See Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 352 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Other courts of appeals
have similarly recognized the hybrid nature of the district attorney’s office—distinguishing between a
DA’s prosecutorial function and his role as elected county policymaker.”).
220. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637–40 (1980).
221. Professor Michelle Dempsey offers the following useful explanation:
In acting qua prosecutor, one acts on behalf of the state. In England and the US, for example,
prosecutors act in the name of the ‘Queen’ or the ‘People of . . .’, the ‘State of . . .’, or the ‘City
of . . .’. This observation helps explain the sense in which prosecutorial action is state action.
It is important to note the kind of claim being advanced here: it is a conceptual claim regarding
the role of prosecutor and the nature of prosecutorial action. The claim is simply that
prosecutors act on behalf of their state in the sense that they act as agents of the state.
MICHELLE MADDEN DEMPSEY, PROSECUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ANALYSIS 48 (2009).
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Yet, their role in government is more complicated. Joan Jacoby describes the
multiple roles of prosecutors as follows:
He is the principal representative of the state before the courts, charged
with the responsibility of upholding the laws and the constitution. He is
reviewing officer for all arrests made by the police and is therefore an
interpreter of the laws, capable of influencing the character and quality
of law enforcement decisions through the decisions he makes in charging
crimes. . . . He is a locally elected politician with an independent source
of power—the local voters—and can exercise independent judgment and
discretion by making key policy decisions for his community. 222
In short, district attorneys are a bit of a hybrid, acting as both state and local
officials. 223
In contrast to district attorneys, municipalities are more local in character.
Municipalities, literally, are created by the states. A municipality, or municipal
corporation, is “[a] city, town, or other local political entity formed by charter
from the state and having the autonomous authority to administer the state’s
local affairs.” 224 In an earlier piece, Professor Teressa Ravenell explains the
dissemination of power from state to local governments and officials as follows:
Through a charter, a state may give municipalities within its domain the
power to administer certain local affairs and activities. This state charter
may delegate certain powers to a governing body . . . . [A] charter may
delegate certain powers to a specific municipal official, such as a sheriff,
or may allow the governing body to delegate certain powers. Finally,
“low-level” municipal employees are charged with executing the policy
and decisions enacted by the governing body and governing officials. 225
Municipalities, like prosecutors, are created by the state to perform a
specific function. In the case of municipalities, that function is to carry out “the
state’s local affairs.” 226 Yet, unlike prosecutors, municipalities do not enjoy
sovereign immunity. 227 As the Court explains in Owen v. City of Independence, 228
“the municipality was an arm of the State, and when acting in that
‘governmental’ or ‘public’ capacity, it shared the immunity traditionally
accorded the sovereign.” 229 However, the Court went on to explain “[b]y
including municipalities within the class of ‘persons’ subject to liability for
222. JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY, at xv (1980).
223. Id.
224. Municipality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
225. Teressa E. Ravenell, Blame It on the Man: Theorizing the Relationship Between § 1983 Municipal
Liability and the Qualified Immunity Defense, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 153, 163–64 (2011).
226. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
227. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 645 (1980).
228. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
229. Id. at 645.
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violations of the Federal Constitution and laws, Congress—the supreme
sovereign on matters of federal law—abolished whatever vestige of the State’s
sovereign immunity the municipality possessed.” 230 Local governments are not
liable because they are unrelated to the state—they clearly derive their authority
and existence from the state. Rather, they are liable despite being an arm of the
state. 231
Finally, we must consider how courts characterize police officials in § 1983
litigation. A § 1983 plaintiff may choose to sue a governmental employee in the
employee’s “personal” or “official capacity.” 232 As the Supreme Court explained
in Kentucky v. Graham, 233 when a plaintiff sues a government official in their
official capacity, it is “in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit
against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party
in interest is the entity.” 234 Accordingly, when, for example, § 1983 plaintiffs
sue Philadelphia police officers in the officers’ “official capacity,” they are in
fact suing the City of Philadelphia—the entity for whom the officers work. 235
This, of course means that the plaintiff will have to prove that the municipality
subjected or caused the plaintiff to be subjected to the deprivation of a federally
protected right. In short, the case really becomes a “Monell claim” 236 against the
municipality. 237 On the other hand, when a § 1983 plaintiff sues a police official
230. Id. at 647–48.
231. Id. at 646 (noting that, historically, courts treated municipalities as an arm of the state when
acting in a governmental or public capacity but “by the end of the 19th century, courts regularly held
that in imposing a specific duty on the municipality either in its charter or by statute, the State had
impliedly withdrawn the city’s immunity from liability for the nonperformance or misperformance of
its obligation”).
232. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (comparing “personal-capacity suits” and “official
capacity” suits).
233. 473 U.S. 159 (1985)
234. Id. at 165–66.
235. See id. at 166. Similarly, when § 1983 plaintiffs sue a department or entity within a
municipality, they actually are suing the municipality. See Garcia v. City of Merced, 637 F. Supp. 2d
731, 760 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing § 1983 action against police department and sheriff’s department
because “[n]aming a municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a
§ 1983 action against a municipality”); Hoisington v. County of Sullivan, 55 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Under New York law, a department of a municipal entity is merely a subdivision of
the municipality and has no separate legal existence.”).
236. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see, e.g., Fareed Nassor Hayat, Preserving
Due Process: Applying Monell Bifurcation to State Gang Cases, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 129, 159 (2019) (“A
Monell claim refers to a lawsuit against a State entity (i.e. a police department, municipal entities,
government agency, etc.) that claims that the State's use of custom or policies violate the constitutional
rights of an individual.”); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 944–47
(2014).
237. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691–92. As the Court explained in Monell, “a municipality cannot be
held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. To prevail against a municipality, a § 1983
plaintiff must identify a municipal policy or custom and prove that it caused the plaintiff to be deprived
of a constitutional right. Id. This is easier said than done. See Cox v. District of Columbia, 821 F. Supp.
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in the officer’s personal capacity, the officer, theoretically, will be personally
liable if the plaintiff prevails. 238
When a § 1983 plaintiff sues a government official in their personal
capacity, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was acting under color of
state law to prevail. 239 This element ensures that government officials are not
liable under § 1983 for their private conduct. For example, when a police official
is at home, off duty, and mowing their lawn, there is little question that they
should be characterized and treated as a private actor. However, when public
employees don a cloak of authority bestowed upon them by the state as a
privilege of their employment, they are personally liable under § 1983. 240
In Monroe v. Pape, 241 the plaintiffs brought a § 1983 suit against thirteen
Chicago police officers for depriving them of their Fourth Amendment
rights. 242 The City of Chicago argued that the alleged acts “were committed
contrary to all state laws and city ordinances” and, accordingly, the defendants
were not acting under the color of state law. 243 Rejecting this argument, the
Supreme Court held that, despite their abuse of power, the officers acted under
color of state law. 244 “This is because such officials are ‘clothed with the
authority’ of state law, which gives them power to perpetrate the very wrongs
1, 17 (D.D.C. 1993) (“Once a municipal policy or custom has been established, causation, often an even
more difficult hurdle, must be spanned. The plaintiff must prove that there is ‘a direct causal link
between a municipal policy or custom, and the alleged constitutional deprivation.’” (quoting City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989))).
238. See infra notes 263–64 and accompanying text (noting that municipalities almost always
indemnify police officials for the costs of liability and litigation).
239. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (“Personal-capacity suits seek to impose
personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law.”). To be clear,
§ 1983 plaintiffs will always be required to prove that the defendant acted under color of state law. In
contrast, when a plaintiff sues a municipality (or sues a municipal employee in their official capacity,
which is the equivalent of suing the municipality), the under-color-of-state-law element is irrelevant.
A municipality, as an arm of the state, always acts under the color of state law.
It is also useful to note that the under-color-of-state-law element is similar but distinct from the
“state action” element necessary to establish most constitutional deprivations. See Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982) (recognizing two distinct elements and holding “that [although]
conduct satisfying the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies the statutory
requirement of action under color of state law, it does not follow from that that all conduct that satisfies
the under-color-of-state-law requirement would satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of
state action”).
240. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (“Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law
and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken
‘under color of’ state law.’” (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325–26 (1941), overruled
on other grounds by Monell, 436 U.S. 658)).
241. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
242. Id. at 203.
243. Brief for Respondents at 2, Monroe, 365 U.S. 167 (No. 39).
244. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184. One interesting—but often ignored—point about Monroe is that
throughout the opinion the Court refers to city police officials as acting under color of state law. See
id. at 167. This, arguably, reflects the idea that city officials ultimately derive their power from the
state.
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that Congress intended § 1983 to prevent.” 245 The officers’ liability in Monroe
was very much premised on their status as governmental officials. They were
liable under § 1983 because they were officials acting under the color of state
law.
To summarize, governmental status is a principal element determining
whether a § 1983 plaintiff has a viable claim against a defendant. Section 1983
requires that the defendant acted under color of state law. As an arm of the
state, a municipality always acts under color of state law. District attorneys
performing prosecutorial duties not only act under color of state law, but most
states treat them as a state actor, entitling them to sovereign immunity and
shielding them from liability. Finally, executive officials, like police officers, are
liable under § 1983 when they act under color of state law, and although they
indirectly derive their power from the state, they are considered local officials
and are entitled to only qualified immunity. In the end, whether courts
categorize a defendant as a private individual, local official, or state actor will
often be dispositive. Yet, importantly, each of these entities, at least indirectly,
derives their power from the state.
C.

Reconceptualizing § 1983 Defendants

Courts and scholars considering the effect of issue preclusion rules in
§ 1983 litigation where a criminal court previously made a probable cause
determination have given woefully little attention to the relationship among
actors in the criminal justice system, and particularly the shared public identity
of these actors. Identity is also a key component of preclusion doctrines. One
of the basic requirements of issue preclusion is that the person against whom it
is being asserted was a party to the original suit. 246 As argued in the preceding
section, identity is also a key element of § 1983 liability. Because the civil
plaintiff was the criminal defendant in the original suit, many courts will allow
a civil defendant (e.g., the police or municipality) to assert issue preclusion in
the subsequent civil case. On the other hand, courts refuse to allow the civil
plaintiff to assert issue preclusion against the police or municipality, reasoning
that neither was a party to the original suit. Yet preclusion rules ignore the
shared government identity of § 1983 defendants. 247
245. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 949 n.5 (1982).
246. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008) (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40
(1940)). There are recognized exceptions to this requirement. See supra Section II.C.
247. Furthermore, the public/private debate operates on several different planes: (1) public interest
versus private right, (2) public law versus private law, and (3) public official versus private litigant.
In Taylor, the parties framed the issue, in part, as a question about the distinction between public
interests and private rights. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 34, Taylor, 553 U.S. 880 (No. 07-371)
(“Because the right of disclosure under FOIA is a public right, a more flexible standard for establishing
privity is appropriate.”). The Court has defined the right at issue as a “public interest” when the
litigation only has an “indirect impact on the [plaintiff’s] interest.” Richards v. Jefferson County, 517
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1. Merging Identities
As detailed in Section III.B, courts classify § 1983 defendants as state,
local, or private and will often categorize the official based upon their conduct.
For example, prosecutors may be labeled state actors when they prosecute
crimes but local officials when making hiring decisions. 248 Similarly, police
officials may be acting under color of state law when they restrain a suspect but
acting in a personal capacity when they subdue their child. Thus, we might
understand conduct on a sort of spectrum, with state conduct on one end and
private behavior on the other. The prosecutor, municipality, and local officials
are all a bit of a hybrid of state and local power and their conduct falls
somewhere along this spectrum.
Furthermore, prosecutors, municipalities, and police officials are joined by
the public nature of their identities. Liability determinations often depend on
whether courts characterize them as state, local, or private actors. Yet, when we
look at where their power originates, all public actors are, in fact, state actors.
The lines we draw between state and local officials largely differentiate who is
entitled to sovereign immunity and who is not.
More importantly, in the context of criminal prosecutions where the
prosecutor chooses to pursue criminal charges and challenges plaintiffs’ motions
to suppress evidence, the prosecutor, municipality, and police are “the same

U.S. 793, 803 (1996). The Court has noted that “the States have wide latitude to establish procedures
. . . to limit the number of judicial proceedings” in cases involving a public interest. Id. In contrast, a
private right is “a right that forms part of a person’s legal status or personal condition.” Personal Right,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Arguably, when litigation involves a private right, as
opposed to a public interest, courts are less likely to give preclusive effect to prior litigation. See, e.g.,
Richards, 517 U.S. at 803 (distinguishing between “public” and “private” actions).
Courts and scholars may also present the public/private debate as the distinction between public
law and private law. Although scholars have failed to settle on a definition of “public law,” the
distinction endures, with many scholars speaking of the differences as both self-evident and dispositive.
See Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 136 2 (1982).
Professor Abram Chayes’s description of the public law/private law distinction is perhaps the most
cited. He describes lawsuits as the traditional “vehicle for settling disputes between private parties
about private rights.” Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1282 (1976). He notes that, in contrast, the object of modern public law litigation “is the
vindication of constitutional or statutory policies.” Id. at 1284. Consequently, defendants in public law
litigation will usually be government officials. Thus, under Chayes’s definition, the public law/private
law distinction seems to turn on two variables: (1) the source of the law and (2) the identity (and
number) of the litigants. See id. at 1282–84. Courts and legal scholars have used both of these variables,
separately and together, to define public law. See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 494–95
(1953) (noting that a law may be classified as public or private based upon the breadth of its application,
“the body of law from which they are derived,” or whether a state is a party to the proceedings); David
Sloss, Polymorphous Public Law Litigation: The Forgotten History of Nineteenth Century Public Law
Litigation, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1757, 1767–68 (2014).
248. See, e.g., Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1992); Carter v. City of
Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 352 (3d Cir. 1999); Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1997);
Owens v. Fulton County, 877 F.2d 947, 952 (11th Cir. 1989).
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party,” united behind the same aim—prosecuting the defendant. 249 As Joan
Jacoby explains, “[t]he prosecutor during the intake process assumes a
nonadversarial review and investigative role, judging and evaluating the
policeman’s work, until the charging decision is made. From that point on, as
the representative of the state, his role is one of advocacy.” 250 Similarly, police
officials’ roles shift from that of an investigator before a suspect is charged to a
witness or “coordinator of witnesses and evidences.” 251 In short, while their
goals and expectations may initially be divergent, 252 once a prosecutor has
decided to pursue charges against a suspect, they essentially have endorsed the
police officials’ decision to arrest. This is especially important to the issue in
this Article—whether civil courts should give preclusive effect to a criminal
court’s determination during a suppression hearing that the police lacked
probable cause to arrest. At this point in the criminal process, it is fair to
presume that the police and prosecutor are “on the same team” and share a
common goal. 253
2. Disturbing “the Peace and Repose of Society”
Given the investment and participation of prosecutors, municipalities, and
police officials in the criminal justice process, it seems odd that they are not
bound by its determinations. As one commentator explains:
The most purely public purpose served by res judicata lies in
preserving the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the
249. But see JOAN E. JACOBY & EDWARD C. RATLEDGE, THE POWER OF THE PROSECUTOR
38 (2016), for a different take on the relationship between police and prosecutors:
Relationships between the police and prosecutors are always ‘iffy’ if for no other reason
than the inherent differences in the goals of the two agencies. For police, it is to protect the
public by keeping the peace, enforcing the law, solving crimes, and arresting offenders
suspected of the crimes. For prosecution, it is to review police work for the legal sufficiency,
make realistic charging decisions, pursue the successful prosecution of defendants, and obtain
reasonable and appropriate sanctions.
250. JACOBY, supra note 222, at 112.
251. Id.
252. There is a strong argument that prosecutors should remain neutral until they decide to charge.
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993) (“A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider
himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.”).
253. Theoretically, by deriving power from the state, police officials (even those behaving
unlawfully) have aligned themselves with the state and should be treated as the same party as the
municipal representative who litigated the first case—the prosecutor.
One might counter that the § 1983 doctrine distinguishes between government officials and the
municipalities that employ them. As the Court explains in Monell, “a municipality cannot be held liable
solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The
problem with this approach is that it allows the § 1983 doctrine to drive the issue of preclusion
determination and ignores the clear relationships among these various government entities that may
be manifested in the criminal proceedings.
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corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice
litigated to inconsistent results. It is easier to live with the abstract
knowledge that our imperfect trial processes would often produce
opposite results in successive efforts than to accept repeated concrete
realizations of that fact. 254
It seems particularly problematic that key players in the criminal justice
system—police and local governments—may collaterally challenge criminal
dispositions. As the Court said in Owen when it refused to extend qualified
immunity to municipalities:
[h]ow “uniquely amiss” it would be, therefore, if the government itself—
"the social organ to which all in our society look for the promotion of
liberty, justice, fair and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy norms
and goals for social conduct”—were permitted to disavow liability for the
injury it has begotten. 255
Similarly, it seems deeply problematic that government actors heavily involved
and invested in the criminal justice system—police and municipalities—are not
bound by probable cause determinations when the case shifts from criminal to
civil courts, regardless of whether those determinations are favorable or
unfavorable to their defense. Consistency seems especially important in the
context of criminal dispositions, where varied results would seem to be evidence
of a flawed and imperfect system where “truth” and “justice” are relative
terms. 256 If those who are part of the criminal justice system challenge its
outcomes, shouldn’t we all?
Consistent with these concerns, the Court has refused to hear civil cases
brought by prisoners that would undermine their criminal conviction. In Heck
v. Humphrey, 257 Roy Heck filed a § 1983 action against the police and
prosecutors alleging that their investigation and prosecution deprived him of
his constitutional rights. 258 Heck did not seek injunctive relief or release, but
rather compensatory and punitive monetary damages. 259 Nevertheless, the
Court held that, under these circumstances, there was no cause of action
available to a § 1983 plaintiff absent a showing that criminal action terminated
in favor of the accused. 260 Stressing the importance of finality and consistency,
the Court offered the following rationale:

254. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 138.
255. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
256. Typically, when a party asserts issue preclusion, they will rely on a prior civil disposition. See,
e.g., In re Beegkey, 529 B.R. 98, 103 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2015).
257. 512 U.S. 477 (1994)
258. Id. at 478–79.
259. Id. at 479.
260. Id. at 489.
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This requirement “avoids parallel litigation over the issues of probable
cause and guilt . . . and it precludes the possibility of the claimant [sic]
succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the
underlying criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial
policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of
the same or identical transaction.” . . . We think the hoary principle that
civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity
of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that
necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his
conviction or confinement. 261
Clearly the circumstances are a bit different in cases where the criminal court
found that there was not probable cause, but the principles are the same.
Allowing a civil defendant to relitigate the probable cause question has the
potential to lead to inconsistent results. So why allow it?
The primary reason civil courts allow police and municipalities to
relitigate the question of probable cause is that they were not parties to the
original suit, which was brought by the prosecutor, a state actor. 262 This
assumption appears to ignore two important considerations: (1) that all power
derived from the state and the state label, arguably, is a means to determine
who is entitled to sovereign immunity; and (2) in many criminal cases the
prosecutor, municipality, and police have shared interests and a common aim.
Additionally, practice suggests there is little division between
municipalities and their police officials. In her groundbreaking article, Police
Indemnification, Professor Joanna Schwartz offers empirical evidence that
“[p]olice officers are virtually always indemnified” in the § 1983 suits brought
against them. 263 In other words, when police officials have civil judgments
entered against them (either through trial or settlement) the government
261. Id. at 484–86.
262. For example, in McCurry v. Allen, 688 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1982), McCurry brought a § 1983
action against police officials for an illegal search of his home. Id. at 583. On remand, McCurry argued
that the defendant police officials were “collaterally estopped to deny that part of the search and seizure
of evidence from his home was unconstitutional because, in his state criminal prosecution, the trial
court granted his motion to suppress a portion of the evidence seized.” Id. at 587. This seems a sound
argument. Based upon the outcome of the criminal court proceedings, there is little question that the
police deprived McCurry of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search and
seizure when they searched drawers in his home and the tires on the back porch of his home.
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit quickly dismissed McCurry’s argument that the criminal court’s
conclusion should be given preclusive effect. Id. The court reasoned, “[o]ffensive use of collateral
estoppel is clearly inappropriate in this case, because the present defendants were not parties to the
prior state-court proceedings.” Id. In other words, the criminal case was between the state and
McCurry, and the officers were not viewed as the same as the “state.”
263. Schwartz, supra note 236, at 890 (“Between 2006 and 2011, in forty-four of the country’s
largest jurisdictions, officers financially contributed to settlements and judgments in just .41% of the
approximately 9225 civil rights damages actions resolved in plaintiffs’ favor, and their contributions
amounted to just .02% of the over $730 million spent by cities, counties, and states in these cases.”).
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employer—not the individual official—almost always foots the bill.
Furthermore, “many municipal employers also provide legal representation for
their employees in civil suits against the employee—even when the employee
is being sued in a personal capacity and the municipality is not a party to the
suit.” 264 In essence, the municipality stands in its employee’s stead, accepting
the obligations of representation and the onuses of liability. So understood, the
municipality is represented in both the criminal and the civil suits, through the
prosecutor in one and, for all intents and purposes, the defendant in the
second. 265
* * *
Federal courts hearing § 1983 actions classify public parties according to
state municipal law and state issue preclusion law. When interpreting
preclusion’s same-party requirement, courts consistently hold that the
prosecutors, police officials, and municipalities are not the same party. As this
section demonstrates, courts have failed to appreciate the logical and practical
connection between the state and municipal police officials. Given the common
public identity of prosecutors, municipalities, and police (and their shared
interests in the criminal justice system), we suggest that courts should presume
same-party status in most § 1983 probable cause cases and preclude the
defendants from relitigating the criminal court’s finding. This approach
comports with normative values. Specifically, a desire for both consistency and
equity should prompt courts to treat these governmental entities as the same
party. However, there may be the rare case in which there is a clear and
documented misalignment or disagreement amongst these parties. In those
cases, the municipality or the police should have an opportunity to come
forward with evidence that they, in fact, should not be treated as the same party
as the State. For example, the official might offer evidence that the government
is not representing or indemnifying them, or that the prosecutor’s interest or
arguments are misaligned with the municipalities. But, in these rare occasions,
the burden of production would fall on the civil defendant.
Though few and far between, we anticipate there will be occasions where
§ 1983 police officials and municipalities successfully rebut the presumption
that the court should treat them as the same party as the prosecutor. However,
even in these rare cases, it is important that the court consider how the criminal

264. Teressa E. Ravenell & Armando Brigandi, The Blurred Blue Line: Municipal Liability, Police
Indemnification, and Financial Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 62 VILL. L. REV. 839, 842 (2017).
265. A prosecutor is a hybrid, acting as a local official and state official. Although courts may
classify a prosecutor as a state actor when prosecuting a case, it is important to remember that they
remain an elected official. This role continues, even when they are in court. Consequently, a prosecutor
must consider the interests of the municipality.
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proceeding affects a motion for summary judgment on the question of probable
cause.
IV. JUST PROCEDURE
Even if a federal court determines that a police officer who is now being
sued civilly is not the same party that litigated the criminal case, that court
should rarely, if ever, dismiss the plaintiff’s claim on summary judgment on the
question of probable cause.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 56”) orders a
federal district court to “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” 266 The Supreme Court has explained that there is
a genuine dispute when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 267 This raises an interesting question:
whether the prior criminal determination establishes a genuine dispute
regarding probable cause when a § 1983 defendant moves for summary
judgment on the question of probable cause.
Noting that judges often disagree about whether summary judgment
should be granted, Professor Suja Thomas has proposed a “consensus
requirement.” 268 “Under this requirement, if one judge decides a reasonable jury
could find for the nonmoving party, summary judgment will be denied.” 269 She
offers three reasons for this requirement, one of which is particularly relevant
to this Article: the problem of massaging facts. 270 Professor Thomas offers the
following description of this practice:
Massaging facts occurs when judges who possess the same information
use it in different manners. Massaging facts can occur in a number of
ways. It can occur when a court ignores relevant facts. It also can happen
when courts do not consider different ways to view the facts. In other
words, they do not take into account the reasonable inferences favoring
the party not moving for summary judgment. 271
This practice is particularly interesting when considering the effect of criminal
court determinations in civil litigation. At least one judge—a criminal court
judge—has already determined whether there was probable cause. Assume that
the criminal judge found probable cause wanting. From this, one might
conclude that a reasonable jury could also determine that the officer lacked
266. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
267. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
268. Suja A. Thomas, Reforming the Summary Judgment Problem: The Consensus Requirement, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2244 (2018).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 2252.
271. Id.
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probable cause and, accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
on this issue should be denied.
Thus, it is important to understand how federal courts should apply Rule
56. As the dissenting Justices explained in Johnson v. Louisiana, 272 “it has long
been explicit constitutional doctrine that the Seventh Amendment civil jury
must be unanimous.” 273 Again, summary judgment should be denied only when
a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. 274 Theoretically,
if we are to interpret the summary judgment standard against the background
of the Seventh Amendment to deny the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, the court must decide that all twelve jurors could (not would) find
for the § 1983 plaintiff when the defendant moves for summary judgment on
the issue of probable cause. 275
Yet, in practice, courts seemingly do not apply such a burdensome
standard. One district judge offers the following useful observation as he
“struggled” to determine whether there was a genuine issue of material fact:
“the measure is not whether an entire and presumptively unanimous ‘jury’ of
from six to twelve members could find for the nonmoving party, but rather
whether one such fact finder could find for that party so long as that individual
juror is acting reasonably.” 276 And while the Supreme Court has not held that
the possibility of one reasonable juror finding for the nonmoving party is a
sufficient basis for denying summary judgment, it has advised trial court judges
to bear the following in mind:

272. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
273. Id. at 382 (“[U]nanimity was one of the peculiar and essential features of trial by jury at the
common law. No authorities are needed to sustain this proposition.” (quoting Am. Publ’g Co. v. Fisher,
166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897))). Importantly, in Johnson, the issue was not whether a civil verdict required
a unanimous verdict. Rather, the question was whether a criminal guilty verdict issued by a divided
state jury (nine of twelve jurors) violates the Federal Constitution. Id. at 357–58. A majority of the
Court held that it did not. Id. at 364 (“We perceive nothing unconstitutional or invidiously
discriminatory, however, in a State’s insisting that its burden of proof be carried with more jurors where
more serious crimes or more severe punishments are at issue.”).
274. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468–69 (1992).
275. As Justice Brennen explained in his dissent in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986),
the burden of production and persuasion in summary judgment should follow the burden of pleading.
Id. at 330–31 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Teressa E. Ravenell, Hammering in Screws: Why the Court
Should Look Beyond Summary Judgment When Resolving Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 VILL.
L. REV. 135, 183 (2007) (“Both legal scholarship and appellate opinions seem to agree with Justice
Brennan’s assessment.”). Accordingly, because § 1983 plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the
defendant deprived them of a constitutional right, they also bear the burden of production at the
summary judgment stage. See supra Section I.B (establishing that § 1983 plaintiff bears the burden of
proof on the question of probable cause).
276. Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Harman Int’l Indus., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 297, 308 n.7 (D. Mass.
2008); see also Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 964 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[S]uccessfully
opposing [the defendant’s] motion for summary judgment did not mean that the [plaintiff] had
established liability or would obtain a favorable, unanimous jury verdict.”).
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[S]ummary judgment motions [do] not denigrate the role of the jury. It
by no means authorizes trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations,
the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is
ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The
evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences
are to be drawn in his favor. 277
Unfortunately, applying the summary judgment standard seems, at best,
cumbersome. 278 Professor Thomas argues that summary judgment requires a
judge to do the impossible: “For a judge to determine what a reasonable jury
could find, it appears that a judge would be required to imagine who would sit
on the jury, how the jurors would deliberate, and the conclusion that they would
reach.” 279
This is not to suggest that summary judgment is always inappropriate. A
court can and should grant a motion for summary judgment when the movant
shows that there is no evidence on the record to support a necessary element of
the nonmoving party’s claim or defense. For example, when § 1983 plaintiffs
fail to offer any evidence that the defendant caused them to be deprived of a
constitutional right, summary judgment is clearly appropriate—a jury cannot
find for the plaintiff unless they establish all of the elements of their claim.
However, when a § 1983 plaintiff alleges false arrest, false detention, or
malicious prosecution claims and a criminal court has already found probable
cause wanting, the plaintiff will be able to come forward with evidence showing
there is a genuine issue of material fact: the criminal court record and their own
testimony regarding the events.
The fact-specific nature of probable cause makes it especially difficult to
predict how a jury will rule on the issue. In District of Columbia v. Wesby, 280 the
Court noted the following about probable cause:
Probable cause “turn[s] on the assessment of probabilities in particular
factual contexts” and cannot be “reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” It
is “incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages.”
Given its imprecise nature, officers will often find it difficult to know

277. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).
278. Id. at 265–67 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[H]ow does a judge assess how one-sided evidence
is, or what a ‘fair-minded’ jury could ‘reasonably’ decide?”); see also Thomas, supra note 268, at 2251
(“[T]he reasonable jury standard is impossible to implement.”).
279. Thomas, supra note 268, at 2249.
280. 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018).
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how the general standard of probable cause applies in “the precise
situation encountered.” 281
This argument applies with equal force to jurors. Just as law enforcement
officials may be uncertain whether probable cause exists, jurors are likely to
disagree on the question of probable cause. Reviewing precisely the same facts,
some may conclude there was probable cause while others may conclude there
was not. The likely inconsistency among juror’s determinations is a clear
indication that summary judgment is inappropriate.
Understood a bit differently, a criminal court’s prior determination that
the police official lacked probable cause, in essence, evidences that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict in favor of a § 1983 plaintiff on this particular issue
and, accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate. 282
CONCLUSION
As a general matter, procedural rules are intended to simplify the litigation
process. 283 Today, preclusion rules are anything but straightforward. The sameparty requirement, once a bright-line rule requiring complete mutuality, has
been dimmed and blurred by a series of exceptions. The problem, however, is
not the exceptions, but the rule itself. Strict application of preclusion’s sameparty requirement has the potential to distort justice and undermine confidence
and efficiency. Courts have created the exceptions to avoid the problems that
arise when they rigidly apply the mutuality requirement.
Perhaps this is most true as we shift from the criminal to civil justice
systems. Suppression hearings are of “critical importance . . . to our systems of
criminal justice.” 284 They “typically involve questions concerning the propriety
of police and government conduct that took place hidden from the public
281. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 232 (1983)); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S.
366, 371 (2003).
282. See Thomas, supra note 268, at 2250 (“[I]f a reasonable jury could find in only one way, then
it seems likely that the judges would agree on the result.”). Similarly, in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372
(2007), Justice Stevens dissented, concluding that summary judgment was inappropriate. Id. at 390
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He reasoned that “[i]f two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently about
the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that
a reasonable juror could disagree with this Court’s characterization of events.” Id. at 396. And although
the majority implicitly rejected Justice Stevens’s argument, it is important to note that the existence of
videotape documenting the events giving rise to the claim was crucial to the Court’s determination. Id.
at 378 (majority opinion) (“There is, however, an added wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of
a videotape capturing the events in question. . . . The videotape quite clearly contradicts the version of
the story told by respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals.”).
283. See, e.g., James C. Dezendorf, The New Federal Rules of Procedure, 18 OR. L. REV. 26, 27 (1938)
(“The prime objective of the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] is to simplify and expedite the handling
of civil cases.”).
284. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 436 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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view”—the very same conduct that will be at the heart of the § 1983 claim. 285
Yet blind application of issue preclusion’s same-party requirement mandates
that courts disregard the criminal court’s determination that the police violated
the Constitution and allows them to relitigate this question in the civil case.
Presuming same-party status of governmental actors in this context is not a
panacea. It does, however, correct a serious asymmetry in the law and ensures
that civil procedural rules do not override our substantive determinations.

285. Id. at 428.

